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The Folly of Early Filing in Patent Law
CHRISTOPHER

A.

COTROPIA

*

This Article questions the conventional wisdom that the patent system should continue
to encourage "early filing" of patent applications-filing at the beginning stages of
technological development. The current thinking regarding early filing fails to account
for the lack of technical and market information available about the invention at the
early stages of development. A "file early, file often" mentality is instilled in inventors,
exacerbating such systemic patent problems as too many patent applications, too many
patents, underdevelopment of patented technology, increased assertion of patent rights,
and fuzzy patent boundaries, to name a few. The Article suggests that in response
patent law should require that an invention be actually reduced to practice before
examination-not a full-blown commercialization, but a real-world embodiment that
demonstrates that the invention works for its intended purpose and the inventor has
proceeded further down the development time line.
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would like to thank the Institute for Intellectual Property and Information Law at the University of
Houston Law Center for awarding this Article the 2008 Competitive Scholarship Grant for tenured
and tenure-track professors. I would also like to thank Michael Abramowicz, Jonathan Barnett,
Dawn-Marie Bey, Colleen Chien, Jim Gibson, Robin Feldman, Scott Hemphill, Tim Holbrook, Paul
Janicke, Lee Ann Lockridge, Clarisa Long, Mark Lemley, Bhaven Sampat, Greg Vetter, and the
participants of the 2008 Intellectual Property Scholars Conference held at Stanford Law School and
workshops at Columbia Law School, SMU Law School, and the University of Houston Law School for
their helpful comments.
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INTRODUCTION

Intellectual Ventures is a private company that sees invention as a
full-time activity.' Instead of engaging in traditional product
development, Intellectual Ventures produces "pure invention." 2 To this
end, the company has filed more than five hundred patent applications,
inventing via one- to two-day "brainstorming sessions."3 The company
has also acquired thousands of additional patents as part of its overall
strategy of looking for inventions addressing "problems that will need a
solution 5-10 years from now." 4
IBM engages in a somewhat similar activity. For sixteen straight
years, IBM has received more United States patents than any other
company in the world. 5 It received 4186 patents in 2008. 6 This is the result

1. Press Release, Intellectual Ventures, Intellectual Ventures Files sooth Patent Application 2
(June 26, 2oo6), www.intellectualventures.corPJdocs/sooapps.pdf.
2. /d.
3· /d. at 1; Intellectual Ventures- Frequently Asked Questions, http://www.intellectualventures.com/
Faq.aspx (follow "How do you come up with your invention ideas?" hyperlink) (last visited Oct. 4,
2009) ("IV's (Intellectual Venture's] invention efforts center on 'invention sessions' which are
multidisciplinary brainstorming events focused on a particular set of issues and possible solutions. IV
typically hosts several 1-2 day invention sessions per month.").
4· Intellectual Ventures-Frequently Asked Questions, supra note 3; Malcolm Gladwell, In the Air:
Who Says Big Ideas Are Rare?, NEw YoRKER, May 12, 2008, at 50; Michael Orey & Moira Herbal,
Inside Nathan Myhrvold's Mysterious New Idea Machine, Bus. WK., July 3, 2006. at 54 (describing the
brainstorming technique used to produce inventions).
5· See Patents, CONSUMER ELECTRONICS DAILY, Jan 16., 2009, (IBM becoming the first company
to pass the four-thousand-in-one-year mark).

68

HASTINGS LAW JOURNAL

[Vol. 6r:6s

of a deliberate business model intended to produce patents for the
purpose of actively licensing them. 7 IBM's efforts have been successful
not only in producing a large number of patents, but also in generating
approximately $1 billion a year for the company.8
Intellectual Ventures and IBM are examples of a larger trend in
patent law. The number of patents being applied for is growing
exponentially, at a rate far greater than the growth of the U.S. economy. 9
And patent holding companies-companies whose sole goal is to file and
acquire patents-"have become commonplace in the modem patent
system." 10 This situation has policymakers and scholars searching for a
reason why patenting far outpaces actual innovation."
This Article provides an explanation for such patenting-patent
rules that push inventors to file for patents early in the technological
development process. The United States patent system actively
encourages so-called "early filing." Early filing causes patents to be
applied for well before a commercial use is identifiable. 13 And while
commentators have criticized the activities of Intellectual Ventures and
IBM and the large number of undeveloped patents as socially harmful, 14
no one really questions the early-filing doctrine that facilitates them.
12

6. !d.
7· See IBM Intellectual Property and Licensing, http://www.ibm.com/ibmllicensing/ (last visited
Oct. 4, 2009) ("In addition to delivering these innovations through its products and services, IBM
maintains an active patent and technology licensing program.").
8. See KEVIN G. RIVETTE & DAVID KLINE, REMBRANDTS IN THE ATTIC: UNLOCKING THE HIDDEN
VALUE oF PATENTS 58 (2000) (stating IBM's licensing revenue as $I billion annually); Gideon
Parchomovsky & R. Polk Wagner, Patent Portfolios, I54 U. PA. L. REv. I, 8 (2005) ("[S)ince the midI990S, IBM has avowedly followed a portfolio-focused patenting strategy, which yielded a more than
400% increase in patent-related revenues (to about $1.5 billion, or about a quarter of total corporate
receipts) even as the research and development budget was slashed .... ");IBM Intellectual Property
and Licensing, supra note 7·
9· See, e.g., Frederic M. Scherer, The Political Economy of Patent Policy Reform in the United
States 28-29 (Harvard Univ. Kennedy Sch. of Gov't, Working Paper No. RWP07-042, 2007), available
at http://ssm.com/abstract=963 I36.
10. Blair Silver, Controlling Patent Trolling With Civil RICO, I I YALE J.L. & TECH. 70, 72 (2009).
I 1. See, e.g., John R. Allison et al., Valuable Patents, 92 GEo. L.J. 435,435-36 (2004) (labeling the
question, "The Case of the Disappearing Patents").
12. See Edmund W. Kitch, The Nature and Function of the Patent System, 20 J.L. & EcoN. 265,
269--70 (I977) (describing the early filing nature of the U.S. patent system).
I3. See infra Part liLA.
I4. See, e.g., Michael Abramowicz, The Danger of Underdeveloped Patent Prospects, 92 CoRNELL
L. REv. 1065, 1066-67 (2007); Ian Ayres & Gideon Parchomovsky, Tradable Patent Rights, 6o STAN. L.
REv. 863, 867--69 (2007) (describing the "line of analysis" that patenting activities such as IBM's lead
to detrimental patent thickets); Nicholas Varchaver, Who's Afraid of Nathan Myhrvold?, FoRTUNE,
July IO, 2oo6, at IIO (describing industry concern over Intellectual Venture's potential assertion of its
large patent portfolio).
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In fact, many scholars have concluded that encouraging early filing
is beneficial. 15 Edmund Kitch, in describing his seminal "Prospect
Theory" of patent law, identified the benefit to early filing as the end of
wasteful rivalrous races to develop a given technology. 16 The early filer
can then use her exclusivity to efficiently manage and coordinate the
invention's technological and commercial development. 17 John Duffy
recently expanded on this line of thinking, noting that the earlier a patent
is filed, the earlier the patent expires, and the earlier the claimed
invention becomes part of the public domain. 18
This discussion fails to recognize some fundamental facts, which are
explored in this Article. First, early filing forces inventors to make filing
decisions and draft applications with little technical or market
information about the invention. 19 Patent law encourages filing shortly
after the invention is mentally conceived. At this stage of development,
the inventor has gained no knowledge from the invention's actual
implementation and use. 20 Nor has the inventor been able to fully explore
the invention's commercial viability. Inventors must file-with little
information and great uncertainty as to the invention's worth-or risk
losing their patent rights forever. Under these circumstances, most
inventors file first and ask questions later.
Second, as time passes after the initial filing, more information
about the invention is uncovered. This new information prompts the
filing of more patent applications to cover variations of the invention
that are now better-defined or shown to be of some commercial worth. 23
The current early-filing nature of the patent system, in the end, creates a
"file early, file often" attitude, explaining the ever-rising number of
undeveloped patents. 24
The United States patent system is intentionally structured to
encourage patent filing early in an invention's development. The patent
system prompts early filing in two ways. First, it removes most barriers to
early filing by not forcing the inventor to actually make the invention
prior to filing or show that the invention successfully produces the
21

22

15. See, e.g., John F. Duffy, Rethinking the Prospect Theory of Patents, 71 U. Cm. L. REv. 439, 440
(2004); Kitch, supra note 12.
16. Kitch, supra note 12, at 265...Q6, 278-79.
17· /d. at 276-79.
18. Duffy, supra note 15, at 444,475-80.
19. See infra Part III.A.2.
20. See infra Part III.A.r.a.
21. See infra Part III.A.r.b.
22. See infra Part III.B.
23. See infra Part III.B.2.
24. See infra Part III.B.2.
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intended results. 25 Second, the system penalizes those who file later in the
development process. The later one files, the later one's presumed date
of invention and the greater the chance that some intervening
development (some new "prior art") will render the invention no longer
new or non-obvious in light of what has been done before, and thus
unpatentable. 26
Pending legislation proposes to change the United States to a firstto-file patent system. Patents would be awarded not to the first to invent
the invention, but the first to file a patent application claiming the
invention. 27 Under the proposed first-to-file system, an even greater
premium will be placed upon an early filing date, with the patent right
going to the first filer even if she was not the first to invent. 28 This makes
a critique of early filing especially timely.
Filing early and often exacerbates many of the patent system's most
recognized problems. It adds significantly to the ever-rising number of
applications, contributing to the backlog and burden on the United
States Patent and Trademark Office (USPTO) that reduces the quality of
examination and issued patents. 29 More applications means more issued
patents, which cause problems of their own, particularly if they are "bad"
patents. 3" The earlier patents are filed, the more likely they go
undeveloped. 3 ' Commercialization does not occur because of the great
uncertainty and the minimal investment at the time of filing. 32 Asserting
an early-filed patent is a cheaper alternative to commercialization. This
low-cost option entices patent trolls who use patents solely to extract
rents from those engaged in commercial development. 33 The dearth of
information and the great uncertainty at the time of filing also
contributes to the lack of clarity in the patent's specification and claims,
causing patent boundaries to be unclear. 34 A lack of adequate notice is
seen by some as the root cause of the patent system's problems. 35

25. See infra Part LA. (explaining the constructive reduction to practice doctrine and the utility
requirement for patentability).
26. See 35 U.S.C. §§ 102-103 (2006) (setting forth the patentability requirements of novelty and
non-obviousness); infra Part LB.
27. See Patent Reform Act of 2009, S. 515, ruth Cong. § 2 (2009).
28. See id.; infra Part LC.
29. See infra Part III.C.r. (explaining how more patent applications overburden the USPTO,
which impedes the USPTO's ability to thoroughly review each application, resulting in erroneous
determinations of patentability).
30. See infra Part III.C. r.
31. See infra Part III.C.2.
32. See infra Part III.C.2.
33· See infra Part III.C.3.
34· See infra Part IILC.4.
35· See JAMES BESSEN & MICHAEL J. MEURER, PATENT FAILURE: How JUDGES, BUREAUCRATS, AND
LAWYERS PUT INNOVATORS AT RISK 8--14 (2006).
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This Article offers a novel solution-moving examination to a later
point in the development cycle. The solution attempts to optimize
examination time to gain the benefits articulated by Kitch, Duffy, and
others while allowing more information and greater certainty about the
invention to be obtained prior to filing. 36 Doing so requires abolition of
the current practice of allowing the patent application to substitute for
actually building and implementing the invention. Instead, all inventors
would be required to reduce their invention to practice before
examination begins and, in turn, prior to the issuance of the patent.
Having such a requirement would push examination further down the
development timeline. More invention information would be available
during examination, and this additional barrier to patenting would
reduce the number of applications in need of examining and ultimately
issued as patents. This new standard would bring with it significant
flexibility, tailoring its requirements to industry practice. 37 Potential
inventors would not be priced out of the incentives of the patent system,
nor would the timing of patenting be pushed too far down the
development process, as complete commercialization prior to filing
would not be required.
The Article proceeds as follows: In Part I, the patent rules that
encourage early filing are explored. Part II examines the previouslyarticulated benefits to early filing discussed by Kitch, Duffy, and others,
and also recites the critiques of these benefits. Part III articulates the
costs associated with an early filing system that have yet to be fully
explored by other scholars. Part III begins by placing the early filing
decision in the context of the typical new-technology development
process and eventually concludes by exploring the many problems such a
mentality creates-too many applications, too many patents,
underdevelopment of patented technology, and increased assertion of
patent rights, to name a few. Part IV proposes moving to an actual
reduction to practice requirement to optimize examination time.
Recognizing the costs associated with early filing and the benefits of
requiring an actual reduction to practice has far-reaching implications for
the current patent discourse. Early filing exacerbates almost all of the
major concerns with the patent system, including the rising number of
applications, the underdevelopment of patented inventions, the creation
of patent thickets, the problem of patent trolls, and the lack of notice of
patent boundaries. Attempting to rectify the folly of early filing can go a
long way in solving these systemic patent problems.

36. See infra Part IV.
37· See infra Part IV.C.
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I. PATENT LAW RULES THAT ENCOURAGE EARLY FILING
United States patent law, and in fact most national patent system
law, has long encouraged inventors to file their patent applications
shortly after the invention's conception. This encouragement is achieved
in two ways. First, patent law removes many of the potential barriers to
early filing by having no actual reduction to practice requirement, a lax
·utility requirement, and the ability to file a provisional application.
Second, patent law incentivizes inventors to take advantage of the ability
to file early by creating a strong presumption that the filing date is the
date of invention and implementing a one-year statutory bar. Patent law
pushes the inventor to file early to increase the likelihood of the patent's
validity. This incentive to file early will become greater if the United
States moves to a first-to-file system, currently implemented by almost
every country's patent system.

A.

LACK OF BARRIERS TO EARLy FILING

No Actual Reduction to Practice Requirement
A fundamental requirement of patent law is that the act of invention
must occur prior to patent protection. 38 Likewise, an applicant must be
the inventor of the subject matter claimed by her patent application. 39 A
specific definition of the act of "inventing" is used to determine whether
the invention requirement is met. The process of invention involves two
steps-conception and reduction to practice-and is not considered
completed until the performance of the second step. 40
Conception, the first step of inventing, involves the mental
formation of the complete invention. 4 ' Conception entails more than
merely identifying a problem that needs to be solved or visualizing an
abstract solution. The mental picture of the solution must be specific and
contain enough detail to enable a person having ordinary skill in the art
I.

38. I WILLIAM C. ROBINSON, THE LAW OF PATENTS 9I (Boston, Little, Brown, & Co. I890) ("An
inventor, in the meaning of the Constitution, is one who has himself conceived the fundamental idea of
the invention .... To him and to him only can a patent lawfully be granted.").
39· 35 U.S.C. § I02(f) (2oo6) (barring patent protection if the applicant "did not himself invent
the subject matter sought to be patented").
40. See id. § 102(g). Notably these two steps of invention-conception and reduction to practicecan occur simultaneously. The typical scenario is that a complete formulation of the invention does not
take place until reduction to practice is completed. See, e.g., Amgen, Inc. v. Chugai Pharm. Co., 927
F.2d I200, I206 (Fed. Cir. I99I) ("In some instances, an inventor is unable to establish a conception
until he has reduced the invention to practice through a successful experiment. This situation results in
a simultaneous conception and reduction to practice.").
41. "Conception is the 'formation in the mind of the inventor, of a definite and permanent idea of
the complete and operative invention, as it is hereafter to be applied in practice."' Hybritech Inc. v.
Monoclonal Antibodies, Inc., 802 F.2d I367, I376 (Fed. Cir. Ig86) (quoting I RoBINSON ON PATENTS
532 (I8go))).
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(PHOSITA) to make or perform the invention. 42 Conception finishes
with the "exterior expression of the mind of the inventor" in the form of
a writing, oral communication, or model. 43
There are two ways to reduce an invention to practice and complete
the final step of inventing. An inventor may actually reduce the invention
to practice by physically implementing the invention and, in the process,
demonstrating the invention works as intended. 44 Actual reduction to
practice is taking the conceived invention out of the inventor's head,
making it exist in real space, and showing that it works. 45
Patent law has long recognized a legal fiction that substitutes for
actual reduction to practice-constructive reduction to practice.46 An
invention is considered constructively reduced to practice when the
invention is described in a patent application that includes a description
of the invention that meets patent law's disclosure requirements. 47 That
is, the patent application must meet the requirements of 35 U.S.C. § II2,
paragraph I -adequately describe, enable, and convey the best mode of
the invention-to count as a reduction to practice.48
The ability to meet the second step of invention-reduction to
practice-constructively removes a potential barrier to filing for a patent
early in the development process. An applicant need only conceive of the
invention and, by filing for a patent that is valid, she necessarily meets
the reduction to practice requirement. 49 The invention does not need to
be built or actually implemented, nor does an applicant need to make

42. See Burroughs Wellcome Co. v. Barr Labs., Inc., 40 F.3d 1223, 1228 (Fed. Cir. 1994)
("Conception is complete only when the idea is so clearly defined in the inventor's mind that only
ordinary skill would be necessary to reduce the invention to practice, without extensive research or
experimentation."); Oka v. Youssefyeh, 849 F.2d 581, 583 (Fed. Cir. 1988) (noting that conception
requires an idea as to the invention's structure and an operative way of making it).
43· Mergenthaler v. Scudder, II App. D.C. 264, 278 (D.C. Cir. 1897). This is mainly for proof
purposes. See Burroughs Wei/come, 40 F.3d at 1228 ("Because it is a mental act, courts require
corroborating evidence of a contemporaneous disclosure that would enable one skilled in the art to
make the invention.").
44· See Medichem, S.A. v. Rolabo, S.L., 437 F.3d II 57. n69 (Fed. Cir. 2oo6).
45· See Cooper v. Goldfarb, 154 F.3d 1321, 1327 (Fed. Cir. 1998).
46. See, e.g., Warren H. Willner, Origin and Development of the Doctrine of Constructive
Reduction to Practice, 36 J. PAT. OFF. Soc'Y 618 (1954).
47· See Hyatt v. Boone, 146 F.3d 1348, 1352-54 (Fed. Cir. 1998) (noting that the application must
meet the written description requirement for the filed claims to be considered constructive reductions
to practice); Bigham v. Godtfredsen, 857 F.2d 1415, 1416 (Fed. Cir. 1988) (indicating that a patent
disclosure must meet the requirement of 35 U.S.C. § II2 to constructively reduce to practice a
particular claim).
48. 35 U.S.C. § II2 (2oo6) (articulating the disclosure requirements).
49· See Hoffmann-La Roche, Inc. v. Promega Corp., 323 F.3d 1354, 1377 (Fed. Cir. 2003)
("'Constructive reduction to practice' is a legal status unique to the patent art. Unlike the rules for
scientific publications, which require actual performance of every experimental detail, patent law and
practice are directed to teaching the invention so that it can be practiced.")
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sure the invention works for its intended purpose. 50 The mental solution
just needs to be written down with enough specificity and detail to
disclose the invention and enable others skilled in the art to practice it.
Other patent doctrines further lower the barrier to meeting the
invention requirement. The patent application, which serves as a proxy
for an actual reduction to practice, need only include a level of detail
needed for a PHOSIT A to practice the invention. This means that
certain implementation details that would fall within this skill level need
not be disclosed. 5 ' The patent's description of the invention can also have
holes that are filled with an acceptable level of experimentation. As long
as the person having skill in the art does not need to engage in "undue"
experimentation, the patent application has provided enough detail to
qualify for a constructive reduction to practice and the ultimate
completion of the process of invention. 52 The description of the invention
is viewed through this lens-a PHOSITA engaged in reasonable
experimentation- and therefore does not need to include many of the
details of the invention's implementation.
All of these legal constructs combine to minimize the demands on
the inventor prior to filing. The inventor does not need to actually
implement or recognize the success of her invention because of the
constructive reduction to practice doctrine. The flexibility inherent in the
disclosure requirements-with the patent application supplemented with
the knowledge of a PHOSIT A and some experimentation -lessens the
specificity of the inventor's articulation of her invention. The inventor
need only conceive of the invention and not much more to invent under
U.S. patent law. 53
There is one caveat. Since the level of specificity is tied to skill in the
art and level of experimentation needed, the more unpredictable the
area of technology, the more that needs to be disclosed. 54 Thus, for

so. See Lawson v. Bruce, 222 F.2d 273, 278 (C.C.P.A. 1955) ("There is no requirement ... that a
party relying on a constructive reduction to practice to establish priority of invention must show a
specific working example to support the compound claimed.").
51. In re Gay, 309 F.2d 769,774 (C. C.P.A. 1962).
52. See AK Steel Corp. v. Sollac, 344 F.3d 1234, 1244 (Fed. Cir. 2003) ("(The specification itself
need not] necessarily describe how to make and use every possible variant of the claimed invention,
for the artisan's knowledge of the prior art and routine experimentation can often fill gaps, interpolate
between embodiments, and perhaps even extrapolate beyond the disclosed embodiments, depending
upon the predictability of the art.").
53· Pfaff v. Wells Elecs., Inc., 525 U.S. 55, 6o (1998) ("The primary meaning of the word
'invention' in the Patent Act unquestionably refers to the inventor's conception rather than to a
physical embodiment of that idea."). This is why it is often said that "[c]onception is the touchstone of
inventorship." See Burroughs Wellcome Co. v. Barr Labs., Inc., 40 F.3d 1223, 1227-28 (Fed. Cir. 1994).
54· Dan Burk & Mark Lemley, Policy Levers in Patent Law, 89 VA. L. REV. 1575, 1653-54 (2003)
(noting that the written description requirement is "a sort of 'super-enablement' requirement" in the
biotechnology field).
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chemical and biotechnology areas, more information is needed for valid
specification that includes the required level of implementation detail.
Accordingly, in order to provide this additional detail, more needs to be
done by the inventor in these technological arts and the barrier to filing
early is not as low.
2.
Lax Utility Requirement
An invention must also meet the utility requirement to gain patent
protection. 55 To meet this requirement, the invention must be capable of
some beneficial use. 56
As applied, the utility requirement is easy to meet for most
inventions. 57 While the invention must have a beneficial use, the level of
benefit necessary is very low. Patent law simply requires that the
invention have some benefit. There is no evaluation as to whether the
invention is useful enough- that is, whether it will provide a certain
quantum of benefit for society. 58 For example, the invention does not
need to be commercially viable. 59 The utility requirement also does not
require that the inventor submit test data to "prove" that the invention is
operable and capable of its intended use. 00 The inventor need only
provide a technical description of the invention that would teach a
PHOSIT A how to operate the invention. 6' In fact, under the current
patent examination guidelines, examiners must presume operability of
the invention. 62 For most technological areas, the utility requirement is a
nonrequirement.

55· 35 U.S.C. § IOI (2006).
s6. Fuller V. Berger, I20 F. 274. 275 (7th Cir. 1903) (articulating the test for utility as questioning
whether the invention "is incapable of serving any beneficial end").
57· See Juicy Whip, Inc. v. Orange Bang, Inc., I8S F.3d I364, I366 (Fed. Cir. I999) ("The
threshold of utility is not high."); Brooktree Corp. v. Advanced Micro Devices, Inc., 977 F.2d ISSS.
I57I (Fed. Cir. I992) ("To violate § IOI the claimed device must be totally incapable of achieving a
useful result .... ").
58. Justice Story articulated the requirement as excluding those inventions that are "injurious to
the well-being, good policy, or sound morals of society." See Lowell v. Lewis, IS F. Cas. IOI8, IOI9
(C.C.D. Mass. I817) (No. 8s68). However, even this view of utility-excluding only inventions with
"negative" utility-has lost favor with the courts. See, e.g.. Juicy Whip, I8S F.3d at I366-67 (cataloging
cases where patents on gambling devices, which are arguably socially harmful, were found to meet the
utility requirement).
59· Duffy, supra note IS, at 453 ("Simply put, patent law has no aversion to awarding
commercially worthless property rights."); Kitch, supra note I2, at 269 ("The patent application need
not disclose a device or process of any commercial value, only a version of the invention that will
work.").
6o. See In re Chilowsky, 229 F.2d 457. 462 (C.C.P.A I956) ("[I)n the usual case where the mode of
operation alleged can be readily understood and conforms to the known laws of physics and chemistry,
operativeness is not questioned, and no further evidence is required.").
61. See I DONALDS. CHISUM, CHISUM ON PATENTS§ 4.04(I) (2009).
62. In re Swartz, 232 F.3d 862, 863-{;4 (Fed. Cir. 2000); Fregeau v. Mossinghoff, 776 F.2d I034,
I038 (Fed. Cir. I985). The presumption is usually only overcome in patents making remarkable claims.
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This low utility requirement removes another barrier to filing for a
patent shortly after conception. If patent law required a use of a certain
commercial or social worth, an inventor would need to take time to
establish that her invention provides this level of benefit before filing. 63
She would need to find a commercially beneficial use for her invention.
Then she would need to produce the data necessary to prove that her
invention actually generated such a benefit. Put simply, an inventor
would need to further develop her invention and investigate its uses
before filing for a patent in order to meet such a heightened utility
requirement. This additional proof is just not required under the current
utility standard for patentability.
There is a notable exception to patent law's lax utility requirement.
In the biology and chemistry fields, patent law has applied a heightened
utility requirement. 64 For inventions in these technology areas, the
invention must have some "terminal application" and there must be
proof that the invention can achieve this ultimate use.65 For example, new
chemicals and the processes that produce them meet the utility
requirement only if a specific, practical use for the produced chemical
has been identified. 66 In addition, patents claiming pharmaceuticals must
at least describe the indicators, such as in vitro tests or animal modeling,
that show the drug's therapeutic efficacy. 67 And for expressed sequence
tags (ESTs) in the biotechnology area, the inventor must identify a
currently-known function for the EST. 68 For these inventions, utility
means "an immediate, well-defined, real world benefit to the public
meriting the grant of a patent" that goes beyond mere operability and
some use. 69
Accordingly, this heightened utility standard stands as an additional
barrier to early filing in these technological areas. The inventor
necessarily needs to do more, both in establishing the usefulness of her
invention and finding the data to prove it. The utility requirement
invalidates those patents that are filed too early because an ultimate enduse of the chemical or pharmaceutical has not been established.

See, e.g., Swartz, 232 F.3d at 864 (affirming the USPTO's determination that a patent claiming cold
fusion was not operable).
63. Kitch, supra note 12, at 26g (noting that the lack of a commercial worth requirement allows
"the applicant [to) proceed from the first positive results to the patent office").
64. Burk & Lemley, supra note 54, at 1644-45.
65. Id. at 1644.
66. Brenner v. Manson, 383 U.S. 519,534-35 (r¢6).
(J?. In re Brana, 51 F. 3d 156o, 1567 (Fed. Cir. 1995).
68. In re Fisher 421 F.3d 1365, 1369-71 (Fed. Cir. 2005).
6g. Jd. at 1376.
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3· Availability of Provisional Applications
The availability of filing a "provisional application" removes
another potential barrier to filing early for patent protection. Introduced
in the United States in 1994, a provisional application is an application
that is designated to not be examined, but instead acts as a placeholder
for a nonprovisional (i.e., real) application to be filed not more than
twelve months later. 70
The significance of provisional applications is two-fold. First, a
provisional application establishes an application's filing date so that,
when converted to a nonprovisional application within a year from the
date of the provisional's filing, the patent application is considered filed
as of the date of the provisionaV' In turn, a provisional application, by
giving a patent application as much as a year-earlier filing date, de facto
adds up to one additional year to the twenty-year patent term. 72 That is,
the nonprovisional patent application's filing date starts the twenty-year
term clock ticking, but if a provisional is filed, the effective filing date is a
year earlier without starting the term clock. 73
Provisional applications remove additional barriers to early filing.
The fees for filing a provisional application are lower than filing a normal
application. 74 This removes some of the cost of filing early. In addition, a
provisional application does not need to include any patent claims. 75
Claims need only be added when the provisional is converted to an
application for examination within the one-year window. This lowers the
costs of filing early even more by removing the need to pay a patent
attorney to get the patent application completely "in order" and draft

70. 35 U.S.C. § ru(b) (2oo6) (defining the provisional application).
71. /d.; id. § II9(e); 37 C.F.R. § 1.53(c)(2) (2008); Robert A. Migliorini, Twelve Years Later:
Provisional Patent Application Filing Revisited, 89 J. PAT. & TRADEMARK OFF. Soc'y 437, 441-42 (2007).
72. Migliorini, supra note 71, at 439 ("The primary purpose of implementing the option for
provisional application filing was to give U.S. inventors the opportunity to obtain an initial filing date
that does not serve as the basis from which the 2o-year term of patent protection is measured.").
73· Changes to Implement 20-Year Patent Term and Provisional Applications, 6o Fed. Reg.
20195,20205 (Apr. 25, 1995) (to be codified at 37 C.F.R. pts. r, 3).
74· See Migliorini, supra note 7 r, at 444·
Another benefit of provisional filing is that it may allow an applicant to obtain an earlier
priority filing date at a relatively low cost then [sic) may be otherwise available if filing nonprovisionally. The filing fee is $roo lower than a non-provisional filing, and more
importantly, there are no excess claims fees.
/d. The average attorney fees for preparing a provisional application is $4384 compared to $9412 for a
relatively complex nonprovisional application on a mechanical invention. AM. INTELLECTUAL PROP.
LAw Assoc., AIPLA REPORT OF THE EcoNOMic SuRVEY 2007, at I-78 to -79 (2007) [hereinafter AIPLA
REPORT).
75· 35 U.S.C. § III(b)(2).
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patent claims. 76 The inventor also gets a year to gather the additional
resources needed to file the actual patent application.
While facilitating early filing, the information in a provisional is still
important. In order to enjoy the provisional's filing date, the provisional
application must fully support the claims included in the nonprovisional
patent application. 77 The claims must be described and enabled by the
provisional application. Accordingly, the inventor must put some thought
and time into the drafting of a provisional application for the early filing
to be worthwhile. But the availability of an early placeholder-which
gives an inventor another year to both decide whether she wants to
devote the full resources to filing a patent application and obtain the
resources needed to file-adds another way the patent system removes
potential barriers to filing early.
B.

INCENTIVES TO FILE EARLY

Filing Date Is the Presumed Invention Date
Determining the date of invention is a critical step in deciding
whether a claimed invention is patentable. An invention's novelty and
non-obviousness are judged with respect to the date of invention. 78
Everything done before the date of invention is eligible to be "prior art"
to the claimed invention. 79 The prior art is compared to the claimed
invention to determine whether the invention has been previously
done-it is anticipated and thus not novd" -or the invention is not a
large enough technological development over what has already been
done-it is obvious. 8 ' Put simply, a patent can only be defeated by that
which was done prior to the invention's creation date.
It follows that the earlier the date of invention, the more likely an
invention will be patentable. The earlier the date of invention, the
smaller the universe of potential prior art. The less prior art available to
compare to the claimed invention, the more likely the invention is novel
I.

76. "Because of the numerous challenges presented by patent claim drafting, the Supreme Court
long ago recognized that a patent specification is one of the most difficult legal documents to draw
with accuracy." Robert D. Katz & Steven J. Lee, Advanced Claim Drafting and Amendment Writing
for Chemical Inventions, in SIXTH ANNUAL PATENT PROSECUTION WORKSHOP: ADVANCED CLAIM AND
AMENDMENT WRITING 335, 339 (PLI Patents, Copyrights, Trademarks, & Literary Prop., Course
Handbook Series No. G4-3977, 1996) (citing Topliff v. Topliff, 145 U.S. 156 (1S92)).
77- 35 U.S.C. § III(b)(I).
7S. See id. § 102(a), (g) (denying patent protection if certain events occur "before the invention");
id. § 103(a) (determining obviousness from the perspective of a PHOSITA "at the time the invention"
was made); Mark A. Lemley, The Changing Meaning of Patent Claim Terms, 104 MICH. L. REv. 101,
!06 (2005)·
79· See 35 U.S.C. § 102(a). The definition of prior art expands to include activities after the date
of invention. See id. § 102(b).
So. !d. § 102(a).
Sr. !d. § 103(a).
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and non-obvious. Essentially, the level of technological progress the
invention is compared against becomes lower the earlier the date of
comparison.
An earlier invention date also benefits an inventor if there is a
contest as to priority of inventorship. Patent law in the United States
awards the patent to the first to invent.82 So if there is a contest between
two inventors, the rights to exclusivity over the invention are essentially
awarded to the one to invent first. 83 Under these rules, the earlier the
date of invention, the more likely one is to win a priority contest.
The filing date is relevant to the date of invention because patent
law presumes the filing date is the date of invention. 84 The earlier the
filing date, the earlier patent law presumes the invention was created.
The burden then lies on the USPTO or defendant, depending on the
venue, to disprove this presumed date of invention. 85 And given that the
filing of a patent application that meets the disclosure requirements
qualifies as a constructive reduction to practice and evidence of
conception, overcoming this burden is extremely difficult.
Just as it is difficult to defeat the presumption and move the
invention date later in time, it is equally hard to establish an invention
date earlier than the filing date. Patent law employs a hei~htened
evidentiary standard to establish an earlier date of conception. There
must not only be some external evidence of conception at an earlier date,
there must also be corroboration of this conception. 87 Meeting this
evidentiary burden is difficult. Before the USPTO, an applicant must
"swear behind" the filing date to get an early date of invention. 88 During
litigation, a patentholder must meet this high standard for proving
conception. 89 The same holds true for priority disputes. 90 The difficulty in
meeting this standard in all of these settings is evidenced by the fact that
82. See id. § 102(e).
83. The determination of priority is actually more complex. See id. § ro2(g) (defining the standard
for determining priority between two inventors of the same technology); Cooper v. Goldfarb, 154 F.3d
1321, 1327 (Fed. Cir. 1998) (articulating the standard in reverse, noting that "priority of invention goes
to the first party to reduce an invention to practice unless the other party can show that it was the first
to conceive of the invention and that it exercised reasonable diligence in later reducing that invention
to practice"); ROBERT P. MERGES & JOHN F. DUFFY, PATENT LAW AND POLICY: CASES AND MATERIALS
440-41 (3d ed. 2002 ).
84. 37 C.F.R. § r.657(a) (2008); Brown v. Barbacid, 276 F.3d 1327, 1332-33 (Fed. Cir. 2002)
(articulating the rebuttable presumption that the filing date is the invention date).
85. Supra note 84.
86. Christopher A. Cotropia, Patent Law Viewed Through an Evidentiary Lens: The "Suggestion
Test" as a Rule of Evidence, 2006 BYU L. REv. 1517, 1585--87.
87. See Cooper, 154 F.3d at 1330; Allen v. Blaisdell, 196 F.2d 527,529 (C.C.P.A. 1952); Cotropia,
supra note 86.
88. 37 C.F.R. § I.I3r.
89. Lora! Fairchild Corp. v. Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co., 266 F.3d 1358, 1361 (Fed. Cir. 2001).
90· Cooper, 154 F.3d at 1330.
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in most priority disputes, the earlier filing date wins priority. 9 ' And even
if the standard for proving an earlier date of invention is met, the process
of getting there, which relies heavily on testimony and written evidence,
is costly.92
In light of the benefits of an early date of invention, the
presumption assigned to the filing date, and the difficulty of proving an
earlier date of invention, patent law creates a strong incentive to file
early. Filing early gives the inventor an early date of invention, which
constricts the universe of available prior art. And given that it is both
difficult and costly to prove a date of invention prior to the filing date,
the inventor knows that the filing date is most likely going to be the date
of invention. This means that the earlier one files, the more likely one's
application is valid.
2.
One-Year Statutory Bar to Patentability
Even if an inventor can prove a date of invention earlier than the
filing date, the filing date is relevant to another patentability
requirement-the statutory bar. Section 102(b) renders a patent invalid if
it claims an invention that was described in a printed publication, in
public use, or offered for sale more than one year prior to the filing
date. 93 The impact of this statutory bar is that activities after the date of
invention, but more than one year prior to the filing date, can render the
patent invalid. These activities that qualify as prior art under § 102(b)
can include publications or offers for sale from the inventor herself that
occur more than one year before filing. 94
Filing date, therefore, means more than getting an early invention
date. The earlier the filing date, the earlier in time the one-year window
exists. And, as noted above, the older the prior art compared to the
invention, the less likely the prior art renders the invention anticipated or
obvious. An earlier filing date also narrows the window between the date
of invention and the filing date. The smaller this window, the less

91. See Mark A. Lemley & Colleen Chien, Are the U.S. Patent Priority Rules Really Necessary?,
54 HASTINGs L.J. 1299, 1317 (2003) ("Indeed, our analysis suggests that in more than half of the cases
in which the senior party won a priority contest, and more than a third of total cases, the senior party
needed to do no more than prove its filing date, suggesting that the entire proceeding was a waste of
time."). But Lemley and Chien did find that, while first filers won in a majority of USPTO and district
court proceedings, junior parties fared better on appeal. /d. at 1312-r3 (including possible
explanations for such a discrepancy).
92. See Woodland Trust v. Aowertree Nursery, Inc., 148 F.3d 1368, 1371 (Fed. Cir. 1998)
(detailing the factors for evaluating the physical evidence and oral testimony required to establish
corroboration).
93· 35 U.S.C. § ro2(b) (2oo6) (invalidating a claim if the claimed "invention was patented or
described in a printed publication in this or a foreign country or in public use or on sale in this country,
more than one year prior to the date of the application for patent in the United States").
94· See id.
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publications and offers for sale of the invention that can take place more
than one year before filing and thus invalidate the patent under
§ 102(b). 95 This is particularly true for prior art created by the inventor,
who is unable to publish or offer for sale the invention before she
actually conceives of the invention. Early filing, therefore, provides the
additional benefit of making a patent less susceptible to a statutory-bar
challenge. The earlier an inventor files, the less exposed her invention is
to statutory bar-oriented prior art. 96
The statutory bar, by both making activities after the date of
invention and the inventor's own activities relevant to patentability,
magnifies the benefits of filing early. And this strong incentive to file
early created by the statutory bar is purposeful. One of the explicit
rationales behind the statutory bar is to push inventors to file early.97
While the United States employs a first-to-invent system, it still
encourages inventors to file for patent protection sooner rather than
later .98 The statutory bar serves this function, preventing inventors from
enjoying the benefits of the patented technology, via commercial
development and public use, outside the twenty-year exclusivity period
that starts at the filing date. 99
C.

MovE TO FIRST-TO-FILE SYSTEM MAGNIFIES INCENTIVES TO FILE EARLY

The United States is unique in that its patent system awards patent
rights to the first to invent, not the first to file a patent application.
Almost all other countries utilize a first-to-file system-the first inventor
to file for a patent, even if they are the second to invent, is awarded the
patent rights to the invention. 100
The United States is currently contemplating moving to a first-tofile system. If such a change takes place, the incentives to file early
101

95- MERGES & DUFFY, supra note 83, at 541-42 ("As the inventor continues to delay filing, more
and more material becomes potentially relevant under § ro2(b). ").
96. /d. (noting that an inventor who files within one year of inventing "has nothing to fear from
§ 102(b) because no references qualify under§ ro2(b) that do not also qualify under§ ro2(a)").
97· 2 DoNALDS. CHISUM. CHISUM ON PATENTS§ 6.01 (2008).
98. See id. There is some flexibility in the form of the experimental-use exception. See, e.g.,
Atlanta Attachment Co. v. Leggett & Platt, Inc., 516 F.3d 1361, 1365-{j() (Fed. Cir. 2008).
99· See, e.g., Pfaff v. Wells Elecs., Inc., 525 U.S. 55, 64 (1998) (noting that one of the purposes of
§ 102 is to "confin[e] the duration of the monopoly to the statutory term"); Pennock v. Dialogue, 27
U.S. (2 Pet.) r, 19 (1829) ("A provision, therefore, that should withhold from an inventor the privilege
of an exclusive right, unless he should, as early as he should allow the public use, put the public in
possession of his secret, and commence the running of the period, that should limit that right; would
not be deemed unreasonable.").
roo. See Brad Pedersen & Vadim Braginsky, The Rush to a First-to-File Patent System in the United
States: Is a Globally Standardized Patent Reward System Really Beneficial to Patent Quality and
Administrative Efficiency?, 7 MINN. J.L. Scr. & TECH. 757, 764-{;5 (2oo6).
IOI. See Patent Reform Act of 2009, s. 515, I I rth Cong. § 2 (2oog).
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become magnified. 102 No longer will it just be the presumption that the
filing date is the invention date pushing an inventor to file early. Instead,
the inventor will file early because the earlier she files, the more likely
she will be the first to file. In a sense, a first-to-file system replicates the
early filing incentives created by the statutory bar, but without the oneyear grace period. The inventor needs to file early because the filing
date, not the date of invention, determines priority amongst competing
inventors. Filing as early as possible-which would be at the time of
conception-is the best course to protect one's right to patent exclusivity
over the invention he or she created.

II.

PREVIOUSLY ARTICULATED BENEFITS TO EARLY FILING

Many have recognized and applauded the early-filing nature of the
patent system. Edmund Kitch, in his Prospect Theory, is probably the
most notable champion of early filing.' 03 He argues that early filing both
facilitates commercialization of the invention and helps to minimize
wasteful races to invent and patent. 104 John Duffy recently built upon
Kitch's work and made the observation that, by incentivizing early filing,
the patent system causes patents to expire earlier than they would
otherwise. 105 These three previously articulated benefits to early filing are
explored below, including the criticisms lodged against these positions.
A.

FACILITATING COMMERCIALIZATION OF THE INVENTION

Edmund Kitch, in articulating his Prospect Theory of patent law,
identified the early-filing nature of the patent system as one of the tools
that furthered the prospect nature of the system. Kitch's Prospect Theory
views the patent system as granting exclusivity over prospects"particular opportunit[ies] to develop a known technological
possibility" -and facilitating their development. "l6 By requiring inventors
to file early, and in turn to receive protection early in the development
process, the patent system gives inventors patent protection at the
beginning of the technology's development.">? Protection at this early

102. Pedersen & Braginsky, supra note 100, at 772. Given the results of Lemley and Chien's
empirical study on inventorship disputes, the U.S. system already de facto acts as a first-to-file system.
See Lemley & Chien, supra note 91, at 1312-13.
103. See Kitch, supra note 12, at 265-{)6, 278-79 (setting forth the Prospect Theory of patents).
104. !d. at 269-70.
105. Duffy, supra note 15, at 444·
1o6. Kitch, supra note 12, at 266.
107. !d. at 269 ("The second important feature of the patent system which makes it function as a
prospect system are rules which force and permit application early in the development process.").
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stage facilitates and maximizes the efficient development and
improvement of the patented invention. 108
Kitch catalogs the many advantages of granting exclusivity early in
an invention's development. Early protection allows the patent owner to
coordinate the development and improvement of the patented
technology,"l9 minimizes duplication of efforts amongst multiple
developers,"o and facilitates the exchange of information."! Providing
protection early also gives the inventor the necessary breathing room to
further develop her invention. 112 She can share information about her
technology with others without fear of misappropriation. 113 By obtaining
patent exclusivity early in development, the inventor can also save on
costly expenditures to maintain the secrecy of her invention." 4
The Prospect Theory's premise that patenting facilitates
commercialization is not without its critics. Robert Merges and Richard
Nelson argue that rivalrous, as opposed to coordinated, development
better facilitates the sequential improvement of invented technologies. us
Merges and Nelson contend that they can present empirical evidence
that rivalry produces rapid technical advancement, while the granting of
broad patent rights typically suppresses such progress." 6 Mark Lemley
comes to a similar conclusion, questioning whether "a single company is
better positioned than the market to make efficient use of an idea." 117
There is good reason that the market, not an exclusive controller,
produces better development and improvement of a patented idea.
Furthermore, as Lemley points out, "[c]reators are often terrible
managers" and "frequently misunderstand the significance of their own
invention and the uses to which it can be put."" 8
However, even Lemley agrees that in certain technological fields,
such as pharmaceutical development, patent protection may play a
crucial role in development post-patenting. In the case of
pharmaceuticals, "control over subsequent development is a necessary

108. /d. at 266.
109. /d. at 276.
IIO. /d. at 278-79.
II 1. /d. at 277-78.
II2. /d. at 276-77 ("[T]he patent owner has an incentive to make investments to maximize the
value of the patent without fear that the fruits of the investment will produce unpatentable
information appropriable by competitors."').
II3. !d. at 277-78.
II4. /d. at 279.
liS. Robert P. Merges & Richard R. Nelson, On the Complex Economics of Patent Scope, 90
COLUM. L. REV. 839,872-77 (1990).
u6. /d. at 877.
117· Mark A. Lemley, Ex Ante Versus Ex Post Justifications for Intellectual Property, 71 U. CHI. L.
REv. 129, 135-37 (providing examples of his argument under copyright law).
uS. /d. at 137.
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part of the incentive to produce the pioneering invention in the first
place."" 9 The need for this control over development is due to the high
costs associated with bringing a developed drug to market.' 2" Exclusivity
from development to Food and Drug Administration (FDA) approval is
needed to encourage pharmaceutical companies to invest in the initialstage research."'
Notably, nothing in Merges and Nelson's or Lemley's critiques
specifically discredits the benefits of an early filing system. Their
disagreement is with the Prospect Theory in general, not the legitimacy
of an early filing regime. The critiques focus on the question of the
breadth of the patent right, not the timing of the grant. They critique
Kitch's conclusion that central control promotes technological progress.
They say nothing about the stage of development in which control is
given. While these arguments have some applicability to the early filing
nature of the patent system, they are not direct rebuttals.
In addition, in this back and forth, no one really questions patent
law's need to provide protection at some time short of the moment of full
commercialization. Failure to provide protection before this point would
severely impact the ex ante incentives to engage in the basic development
patent law attempts to encourage. The farther down the development
chain patent protection attaches, the more uncertain a potential inventor
is that she can eventually gain exclusive protection to recoup research
and development costs. Erecting patent rules that disallow filing for
patent protection until very late in the development game may deter
inventing altogether. This, in turn, would affect commercialization
because the invention would never be created in the first place. So while
there is nothing close to consensus regarding Kitch's Prospect Theory,
there is at least some consensus as to the positive relationship between
early filing and the commercialization of the patented invention.
122

123

124

II9. ld. at 141.
120. Abramowicz, supra note 14, at 1095--96.
121. ld.
122. For example, one could imagine an early filing system that provides narrow rights and
therefore allows rivalrous development and decentralized control of improvements to the originally
patented technology.
123. See WILLIAM M. LANDES & RICHARD A. PosNER, THE EcoNOMIC STRUCfURE OF INTELLECfUAL
PROPERTY LAw 294 (2003) ("The standard rationale of patent law is that it is an efficient method of
enabling the benefits of research and development to be internalized, thus promoting innovation and
technological progress."); CRAIG A. NARD, THE LAw oF PATENTS 28-29 (2008) (describing the ex ante
incentive-to-invent theory of patent law.)
124. See NARD, supra note 123, at 29; Kenneth W. Dam, The Economic Underpinnings of Patent
Law, 23 J. LEGAL STUD. 247, 247 (1994) (noting that it is important to recognize the primary problem
that the patent system solves: "This problem, often called the 'appropriability problem,' is that, if a
firm could not recover the costs of invention because the resulting information were available to all,
then we could expect a much lower and indeed suboptimal level of innovation.").
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MINIMIZING WASTEFUL PATENT RACES

Y oram Barzel recognized that patent rights should be awarded
earlier rather than later to avoid wasteful races to invent. 125 Barzel
observed that the act of inventing a particular technology was a common
resource susceptible to the "common pool" problem causing multiple
firms to engage in inefficient races to invent that dissipate all of the
invention's "special economic value." 126 While Barzel's suggested
solution was patent auctions, 127 Kitch built upon Barzel's observations
and offered the Prospect Theory as an explanation of how the patent
system, by pushing inventors to file early, solved the wasteful patent race
problem. 128 The prospect aspect of the patent system-awarding broad
patent rights early in development-reduced socially wasteful patent
races by shortening them. 129 The earlier patent law ends the race between
multiple researchers seeking to invent the same technology, the fewer
resources are then devoted to a duplicative effort. 130 And, as previously
mentioned, the prospect nature of the patent system also reduces
wasteful postpatenting races by allowing the patent holder to coordinate
the commercialization and improvement of the invention. 131
Yet several scholars question early filing's ability to reduce the
waste created by patent races. Donald McFetridge and Douglas Smith
wrote a reply to Kitch's Prospect Theory article in which they accepted
the postpatenting benefits of patent exclusivity but concluded that such
gains would only intensify the early race to patent. 132 McFetridge and
Smith argued that while the race may end earlier under the prospect view
of the patent, the race still exists at the early stage of development and is
more intense because that much more is at stake. 133 Waste is not
eliminated, but simply produced over a shorter, earlier period under the
patent system's early filing rules. 134 Such early, intense competition then
dissipates all of the rents from the invention at the conception stage. 135
Duffy recently echoed McFetridge and Smith's concerns, seconding that
"by increasing efficiency of post-patent investments in developing the

125. Yoram Barzel. Optimal Timing of Innovations, 50 REv. EcoN. & STAT. 34R, 352 n.II (1968).
126. /d. at 349·
127. /d. at353 n.11.
128. Kitch, supra note 12, at 269-70.
129. /d. at 276-79.
130. /d. at 265~6.
131. /d. at 278--79.
132. Donald G. McFetridge & Douglas A. Smith, Patents, Prospects and Economic Surplus: A
Comment, 23 J.L. & EcoN. 197, 198 (1g8o).
133. /d. at 1g8--201.
134. See id. at 198.
135. /d. at 203; Mark F. Grady & Jay I. Alexander, Patent Law and Rent Dissipation, 78 VA. L.
REV. 305, 316-17 (1992).
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technology, the prospect features of the patent system will merely shift
rent-dissipating patent races backward in time." 136
Others respond that such races are not necessarily wasteful. 137 Early
races to invent are not inevitably duplicative. Two companies may be
attempting to solve a given problem and, at the end of the race, produce
two viable solutions. 138 These alternatives can be, on net, socially
beneficial because their presence may reduce the price of the inventions
produced and provide consumers with a greater selection of products. 139
Such races can also have unrelated positive spillover effects. 140 A
company who loses the race may, in the process of inventing, make an
unintended discovery that solves another societal problem or assists in
the development of that company's next invention. 141
Given the strengths of the critiques, both with respect to whether
early filing actually reduces wasteful patent races and whether races are
truly wasteful, the benefits of early filing associated with patent races are
questionable. However, recognition of the interplay between filing
timing and patent races is necessary when evaluating the timing of patent
filing. The timing of filing definitely has an effect, at least in some cases,
on the length of the race to invent and, in turn, the benefits and
drawbacks of patent races discussed above then become relevant.

C.

CAUSING EARLIER DEDICATION TO THE PUBLIC

Even if the early filing nature of the patent system does not reduce
wasteful patent races, an earlier finish line may still be beneficial. Duffy
reframed the critique of the Prospect Theory as a question of "not
whether rents will be dissipated, but how they will be dissipated. " 142 Duffy
I36. Duffy, supra note IS, at 443·
I37· SeeR. Polk Wagner, Information Wants To Be Free: Intellectual Property and the Mythologies
of Control, 103 CoLUM. L. REv. 99S, IOOI n.I9 (2003) ("There is a rich literature (dealing principally
with patents) suggesting that an analogous tragedy may result from, for example, patent races-where
multiple parties 'race' to create a patentable invention, thereby reducing or eliminating the benefits of
the advance through unnecessarily redundant effort."); Suzanne Scotchmer, Incentives to Innovate, in
THE NEW PALGRAVE DlcrJONARY OF ECONOMICS AND THE LAW 273, 27S (Peter Newman ed., I998) ("The
literature has produced two views of patent races: that they inefficiently duplicate costs, and that they
efficiently encourage higher aggregate investment.").
138. See JEAN TIROLE, THE THEORY OF INDUSTRIAL ORGANIZATION 400 (I988) (indicating that a
patent race loser may develop another, beneficial product); Grady & Alexander, supra note I3S, at
3I6-21.
139. See TIROLE, supra note I38; Grady & Alexander, supra note I3S, at 3I6-2I.
I40. Giovanni De Fraja, Strategic Spillovers in Patent Races, I 1 INT'L J. INDUS. 0RG. I39, I40
(I993); Jennifer F. Reinganum, A Dynamic Game of R and D: Patent Protection and Competitive
Behavior, so EcoNOMETRICA 67I, 6?I (I982).
141. Supra note I40.
I42. Duffy, supra note IS, at 443, 47s-8o (analogizing early patenting to a Demsetzian auction-a
government-run auction where each franchise can bid in terms of price and quality of service for
exclusive access to consumers).
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observed that early filing means early expiration-putting the patented
technology in the public domain earlier. 143 And since earlier filing means
that patent protection begins before commercialization occurs, the
patentholder has less time to exploit the patented technology,
"diminish[ing] the patentee's rents." 144 The patent system, by
encouraging early filing, places the invention into the public domain
sooner. 145 Society gets to enjoy the benefits of the invention sooner,
without the costs of exclusive control.
Michael Abramowicz critiqued Duffy's theory, acknowledging that
the patent expires sooner but observing that this fact raises another
concern: underdevelopment of the patented technology. 146 The earlier in
the development process an inventor files for patent protection, the more
uncertain and, in turn, unlikely it is that the inventor will actually
commercialize the invention. 147 Patent protection, by definition, gives the
patent holder the favorable option of delaying commercialization until
such an action is clearly beneficial to the patent holder. 148 This creates the
possibility that the patent holder will never exercise the
commercialization option during the patent period, instead waiting for
such an option exercise to become more favorable. 149 This lack of
commercialization gets the invention into the public domain quicker, but
makes it more likely the technology is never fully developed. 150
Abramowicz argued that, on net, a pure prospect system with early filing
and fixed patent terms creates the real possibility of underdevelopment
of the patented invention. 151
Ill. COSTS OF AN EARLY FILING DOCTRINE
While there has been discussion about the merits of an early-filing
patent system, the discussion has been mostly one-sided, with no one
fully exploring the costs of an early-filing system. In particular, no one
has examined the lack of information and great uncertainty surrounding
the invention at the time of early filing. Nor has there been a discussion
of the effect this lack of information and uncertainty has on which patent
applications are filed, how many are filed, and the use of such
applications once they issue as patents.

143.
144.
145·
146.
147·
148.
149.
150.
151.

I d. at 444·
Jd.
I d. at 468.
Abramowicz, supra note 14, at 1079.
ld.
Id. at 107')--80.
See id.
See id.
Id. at ro81--82.
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This Part fills these holes in the discourse. It begins with a
description of the technological development process. There is an
enormous amount of technical and market information generated as
development proceeds towards the final goal of commercial sale. And
the amount of information grows as development progresses.
Accordingly, the earlier in the development process a patent is filed, the
less available information there will be about the invention and, more
importantly, how the invention will be used commercially. This lack of
information at the time of early filing leads to uncertainty about the
invention's worth. When compared to the low costs of patenting and the
high, yet probabilistic, potential value of patent protection, inventors err
on the side of filing a patent application on the invention at this early
stage of development. Then, in reaction to the additional information
that becomes available after early filing, inventors file for additional
patent protection by using mechanisms such as continuations,
continuations-in-part, and new applications. All of this leads to overfiling
by the inventor to compensate for the lack of invention information at
the early stage of development and to capture the new information
encountered at later stages. This combination-early filing with little
information and follow-up filing to capture new informationexacerbates the patent system's most recognized problems. It decreases
the quality of patent examination, leads to the underdevelopment of
patented technologies, promotes patent trolls, and creates unclear patent
boundaries.
A.

EARLY PATENT FILING IN THE CONTEXT OF TECHNOLOGICAL
DEVELOPMENT

The filing of a patent application does not occur in a vacuum. It is
typically the offshoot of a technology development process. 152 A certain
amount of development occurs prior to the filing of the patent
application and then, presumably, development continues after filing. 153
Even if the inventor chooses to discontinue development after filing,
time marches on, producing more information about the technologies
that affect the invention and the potential market for the invention.
The question is: where does early filing place the decision to patent
in the process of technological development? To define this time period,
this Part utilizes two concepts. First, the typical new technology
development process is described. Then, the level of technical and
market knowledge required by patent law prior to filing is used to

SeeM. HENRY HEINES, PATENTS FOR BusiNESS 1-8 (2007).
Development post-patenting is not a given, particularly if the patent is filed early. See infra
Part III.C.2.
152.
153.
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identify the point in time where the filing decision occurs during the
technological development. As a result, the amount of information
known and not known at filing becomes readily ascertainable.
I.
Development Process
Development processes vary amongst companies in a given industry
and vary even more between industries. 154 Development processes also
vary in relation to the sophistication and resources of the company or
individual engaged in new technological development. 155 There are,
however, commonalities in such processes.' 56 The process of development
usually occurs in loosely defined stages, starting with an initial "idea"
stage and ending with the commercial launch of a specific product or
service. 157 The goal is that each stage generates more technical and
market information about a potential product configuration, so that
decisions can be made as to which product configurations to continue
developing and which to abandon because of discovered technical and/or
market issues.' 58 The process, hopefully, results in a commercialized
product that is technologically feasible and best meets market demand. 159
The ideas for product configurations that begin most technology
development processes are usually very general.•oo The product ideas rna~
be in response to a market demand-ideas for "market-pull" products.' •
For example, there may be a recognized market need for a smaller cell
phone or a cure for a particular form of cancer and a company might try

154. See Burk & Lemley, supra note 54, at 1581-89 (noting the diverse nature of innovation across
technological industries).
ISS· For example, some companies are very structured in their development processes, using
formalistic development processes such as the traditional STAGE-GATE or PACE process. See, e.g.,
Greg M. Ajamian & Peter A. Koen, Technology Stage-Gate: A Structured Process for Managing HighRisk New Technology Projects, in THE PDMA ToOLBOOK FOR NEw PRODUcr DEVELOPMENT 267 (Paul
Belliveau et al. eds., 2002).
I 56. See RoBERT G. COOPER, WINNING AT NEw PRODUCfS 35-37 (I986) (reporting on the "number
of underlying themes and recurring messages" that emerge from studying multiple companies' newtechnology development experiences).
157· See MERLE CRAWFORD & ANTHONY DIBENEDETTO, NEW PRODUCfS MANAGEMENT 26-33 (8th
ed. 2oo6) (describing the "phases" of new product development); Robert G. Cooper, A Process Model
for Industrial New Product Development, IEEE TRANSACfiONS ON ENGINEERING MGMT., Feb. 1983, at 2,
2-11 (articulating a seven stage development process).
158. See CooPER, supra note I 56, at 4<)-63 (describing both the technical and market information
generated at each stage of the development process). The term "product configuration" is used loosely
to label a technical variation of a product or service that is the part of a new-technology development
process.
I 59· See CRAWFORD & DI BENEDETTO, supra note I57, at 33 (noting that the process is really "an
evolving product, or better, an evolving concept that, at the end, if it is successful, becomes a product"
(emphasis omitted)).
I6o. See CooPER, supra note I 56, at 49 (describing the idea "stage" of development).
I6I. /d. (noting that "market-pull ideas" are "generated by the marketplace-a competitor's new
product, recognition of unsatisfied customers' needs, or direct requests from customers").
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to respond by developing a new product. The ideas may also be
prompted by a new, but not-yet-applied technology-ideas for
"technology-push" productS. 162 A new water-resistant material may be
discovered and development's focus is finding a product that could use
this new technology to meet a consumer demand. From this initial
product-idea brainstorming, a set of possible product configurations are
selected that have potential and then a preliminary assessment is made of
each of them. 163 This evaluation continues, with each stage yielding more
information about the initial product ideas and flushing out particulars in
response to each wave of investigation. 164 This progression of
development seeks to generate and then apply two types of
information- technical and market information. 165
a. Technical Information Generated
A potential product's technol~ical feasibility is the main focus of
the technical side of development. 1 A product's initial technical makeup is defined and then, in order to achieve the required consistency and
adequateness in the product's operation, more technical information
about how the product works is generated. 167 The product's technical
feasibility is eventually explored through experimentation, prototyping,
and other real-world feasibility testing. 168 Throughout this process, the
actual technical specification of the product constantly changes in
response to success, or failure, of certain technical configurations. IfxJ
Questions of technical feasibility also include how to produce and
distribute the product efficiently. In order to make commercialization
worthwhile, a product is usually modified technically to maximize the use
of production and distribution methods. 170 Issues concerning the
162. !d. (identifying "technology-push ideas" as those "generated by research or a serendipitous
discovery").
163. /d. at 55-57 ("Preliminary assessment is the first stage at which significant resources are spent
to gather information regarding the feasibility of a project.").
164. These later "stages" of development can include a concept definition stage, a development
stage, a testing stage, and a trial stage. /d. at 57-63.
165. Id.
166. See Emmett W. Eldred & Michael E. McGrath, Commercializing New Techno/ogy-1, REs.TECH. MGMT., Jan-Feb. 1997, at 41, 42-44 (discussing the targeted technology feasibility point (TFP)
for new technology development). Technical uncertainty is usually very high at the beginning of any
new technology development. /d. at 42.
167. /d. AT 42-44.
168. See TOM KELLY, THE ART OF INNOVATION 103-o6 (2001) (emphasizing that "doing"-such as
building prototypes-is crucial to fully developing innovations); STEFAN H. THOMKE, ExPERIMENTATION
MATTERS 23-25 (2003) (noting how experimentation generates technical information and reduces
technical uncertainty); Cooper, supra note 157, at 2-II (describing the later stages of product
development, including the development, testing, and trial stages, all of which take a concept and use
tools such as prototyping to generate more technical information about a potential new product).
169. Cooper, supra note 157, at 2-II.
qo. See THOMKE, supra note 168, at 25 (discussing the uncertainty in achieving large, cost-effective
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integration of the product into larger products or processes are also
answered during development. 171 A product may also need to work well
with complementary technologies. Such integration or companion use
requires further definition of the technical construction of the product. 172
There is also a feedback between market information and technical
information regarding the product during development. As the market
becomes better known and defined, technical changes occur. 173 The
product's configuration changes to better meet customer demand by
either providing preferred functionality or getting production costs to a
desired price point. 174
b. Market Information Generated
Usually in parallel with the technical development of a product, the
market for the product is explored. 175 Market analysis may start with
small, targeted studies-both to better define the potential markets and
to get feedback on the current technical version of the product. 176 As
development continues and the product becomes more defined, the
market studies become more elaborate and occur on a wider scale. 177 The
target market becomes better defined. 178 Possible competitors and
market position become clearly identified. 179
The feedback between market and technical information also
occurs, this time with newly acquired technical information producing
additional market information. Better understanding of what is
technically feasible and the likely price and delivery date shapes the

production of a new technology).
171. See CLIVE L. DYM & PATRICK LITTLE, ENGINEERING DESIGN: A PROJECT-BASED INTRODUCTION 92
(2d ed. 2004) (identifying the need to define "interface performance specifications" and ensure they
are met).
172. See id. (noting that interfacing technologies with other systems is "extremely hard in
practice," and thus it is helpful to get as much information about how the various technologies
interact).
I73· See CooPER, supra note 156, at 58-62 (describing how market studies and consumer testing
influence the "design requirements for what constitutes a better product").
174. See id.
175. See Michael Abramowicz & John F. Duffy, Intellectual Property for ,~.".1arket Experbnentation,
83 N.Y.U. L. REv. 337, 342-43 (2oo8) (describing the field of market experimentation and arguing
there should be some intellectual property protection for activities).
176. See CooPER, supra note 156, at 54-57 (suggesting such quick initial marketing analysis as a
targeted phone survey).
177. /d. at 57--63 (including in such larger scale market testing a pilot production run where the
product is made and sold in a test market).
178. See id.
179· See, e.g., CHARLES W. LAMB, JR. ET AL., MARKETING 337-38 (8th ed. 2006); JAMES M. MORGAN &
JEFFREY K. LIKER, THE TOYOTA PRODUCT DEVELOPMENT SYSTEM 125-31 (2006) (documenting the
development of the Toyota Prius); Cooper, supra note 157, at 8 (describing the "Preliminary market
assessment" stage of development where information is collected on market size and market
segments).
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market for the potential product. •&o This technical information influences
what the target market is, the level of demand, and the resulting profit. '8 '
The same effect occurs with technical information about other products
which the product in development is going to be integrated with or is
complementary to. '82 As the technical composition of these external
products changes, so too does the market for the product being
developed. '83 For example, if it turns out the product is not as technically
compatible with a complementary technology, that lack of technical fit
narrows the market for the product. Finally, the availability of a
prototype helps generate market information- giving something for
focus groups to put their hands on and provide feedback as to their likes
.
and dislikes of a given product configuration. '84
The development process and, in particular, the progressively
increasing amount of technical and market information, is depicted
graphically below in Figure r. ' 85
FIGURE
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r8o. See Robert G. Cooper & Elko J. Kleinschmidt, An Investigation into the New Product Process:
Steps, Deficiencies, and Impact, 3 J. PRODUCT INNOVATION MGMT. 71, 73-76 (1986) (observing that in
over 250 new product launches, seventy-five percent included an initial market assessment and twentyfive percent included a detailed marketing study).
r8r. See LAMB, supra note 179, at 339-40; Cooper, supra note 157, at 9 (discussing the end of the
concept stage of development, where market studies are done to "gauge ... market acceptance of the
new product: interest, liking, preference, and intent to purchase").
r82. See CRAWFORD & Dr BENEDETTO, supra note 157, at 71-72 (discussing how "technology
familiarity" with "existing platforms" influences new product design).
r83. See LAMB ET AL., supra note 179, at 347 (mentioning compatibility of a new product as one of
five influencing factors on the product's market).
184. See KELLY, supra note r68, at 103-00.
r85. See CooPER, supra note 156, at 54-57; Cooper, supra note 157, at 9 (describing the use of a
prototype to do consumer market testing).
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The technical and market information, shown in Figure I, increases
as the development proceeds towards the goal of the commercial launch
of the product. The dotted lines delineate the stages of development. In
each stage, starting with an idea stage and ending in commercialization,
the number of dots-the potential product configurations-decreases as
certain configurations become identified as not being commercially
viable. The dots that do make it to the next stage grow bigger because
more information is known about that particular product's
configurations. This growth in technical and market information is
represented graphically as a dot larger than the previous stage's dot.
2.
Lack of Information at the Time of Early Filing
Viewed in the context of the technological development process, the
lack of technical and market information at the time of early filing
becomes apparent. The standards for patentability require very little
technical information prior to filing and essentially no market
information. And, as previously discussed, patent law incentivizes
inventors to file shortly after these standards are met, meaning that filing
occurs with little invention information. 186
Patent law requires only a concrete and specific conceptualization of
the invention prior to filing. 187 To be sure, the invention must be more
than just an idea. 188 And an inventor must communicate enough specific
information in the patent application to enable others to build and
operate the invention without undue experimentation. 189 There is also a
base requirement that the invention be essentially operable. 1j0 But patent
law does not require an actual, working embodiment. 191 Patent law also
explicitly assumes the need for more experimentation after filing to
actually implement the invention. 192 This means that when patenting
becomes an option, only a minimal amount of technical feasibility work
must be done. 193
Furthermore, patent law explicitly does not require "a perfected,
commercially viable embodiment." 194 The invention does not need to be
in commercial form. 195 It does not need to operate at the level of
1

186. See supra Part I.A.r.
187. See supra Part I.A.r.
188. See supra Part I.A.r.
189. See supra Part I.A. r.
190. See supra Part I.A.2.
191. See supra Part I.A.r.
192. The experimentation must simply not be undue. See Impax Labs., Inc. v. Aventis Pharms.,
Inc., 545 F.3d 1312, 1314-15 (Fed. Cir. 2008).
193. Kitch, supra note 12, at 27o-7r.
194. CFMT, Inc. v. Yieldup Int'l Corp., 349 F.3d 1333, 1338 (Fed. Cir. 2003).
195. See supra Part I.A.r.
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consistency demanded by commercial use.' 96 This low requirement plays
out in practice. "In general, few patented inventions are an immediate
commercial success. Rather, most inventions require further
development to achieve commercial success."' 97 Certainly this is not the
case for all inventions at the time of filing.' 98 But most patenting occurs at
the precommercialization stage.
The patent rules require even less market information prior to filing.
In fact, knowledge of the potential market is not required prior to
filing. '99 The utility requirement does not judge the commercial viability
of the invention, even for those technology areas that are subjected to a
heightened requirement."'() Most likely, the inventor has a general idea of
the need for the particular solution to which the invention is directed.
However, if the invention is a technology-push invention, as opposed to
market-pull, the inventor may lack even this minimal market information
and have the sole goal of creating a new technology. 201
This means that at the time of early filing, the inventor does not
necessarily have any understanding of the market for the invention. The
inventor does not know what the possible cash flow is from
commercializing the invention. 202 There is little to no information about
the composition of the market, the demand in the market, the particular
features wanted by the market, or the price sensitivity of the market. 203
Essentially, at the time of early filing, there is little information about the
exact specifications the market wants and how profitable it would be to
offer such an invention.
Accordingly, if early filing is placed in the context of Figure I above,
early filing would take place at one of the initial, early stages of
development (located in the left portion of the Figure I). Filing decisions
would be made when the potential product configurations (inventions)
are numerous and undeveloped. That is, early filing occurs in stages with
a high number of small dots.
Possible exceptions to the general lack of technical and market
information at the time of early filing are those inventions for which
patent law requires more technical information. Such areas are chemistry

196. See supra Part I.A. I.
197. CFMT, 349 F. 3d at 1340.
198. Even Kitch admits that "(m]any inventions, including many important ones, are patented in a
commercially significant form." See Kitch, supra note 12, at 271.
199. !d. at 27o--71.
200. As Kitch puts it, all that is required is an invention "that works." See id. at 27o--71.
201. See, e.g., CooPER, supra note 156, at 49 (defining the difference between technology-push and
market -pull ideas).
202. Eduardo S. Schwartz, Patents and R&D as Real Options, 33 EcoN. NoTES 23, 24 (2004)
(identifying estimated cash flow as one of the uncertainties at the time of patenting).
203. See CRAWFORD & Dl BENEDETTO, supra note 157, at 3o--34.

November 2009]

THE FOLLY OF EARLY FILING

95

and biology, where patent law applies heightened enablement and utility
requirementS. 204 This means that applications filed on inventions in these
areas are further along in development when patenting is sought. More
technical information is required-evidence of actual use of the
invention and a definitive end-use application. 205 And, even if the law
does not require market information for chemical or biological
inventions, lo6 some market information is likely generated prior to filing
because such information is typically produced in parallel with technical
development-'"7 So, just as there is more technical information on
chemical and biological invention prior to filing, there is also likely more
market information prior to filing.
3· Resulting Uncertainty
This lack of technical and market information at early filing
generates uncertainty about the future value of the invention and, in
tum, the value of the patent-holder's right of exclusivity.">B There is
technical uncertainty-unknowns about the invention's true technical
viability, the cost and timing of production, and, ultimately, its technical
composition come launch date. There is even more market uncertaintyunknowns regarding market composition, demand, price tolerances, and
ultimate profitability of commercializing the invention.
This uncertainty means that the earlier an inventor files, the wider
the range of possibilities of the future value of the invention. Referring

204. See Janice M. Mueller, The Evolving Application of the Written Description Requirement to
Biotechnological Inventions. 13 BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 615,617 (1998); Arti K. Rai, Intellectual Property
Rights in Biotechnology: Addressing New Technology, 34 WAKE FOREST L. REv. 827, 834-35 (1999);
Margaret Sampson, Comment, The Evolution of the Enablement and Written Description Requirements
Under 35 U.S. C.§ II2 in the Area of Biotechnology, 15 BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 1233, 1262 (2000).
205. Burk & Lemley, supra note 54, at 1644-45.
206. See Duffy, supra note 15, at 453 n.53 (giving examples of where the utility requirement could
be met for a biotechnology invention, even if the invention has no commercial value).
207. See CooPER, supra note 156, at so-63. That is, as they obtain more technical information about
the new technology, they also get more market information. Marketing information is generated while
proceeding technically for a very practical reason-companies who are making decisions to spend
more resources to nail down the technical attributes of a given product want to make sure that each
additional dollar spent is worthwhile.
208. Abramowicz, supra note 14, at 1075 ("Someone who owns a patent cannot be sure how
profitable commercialization of the patent will be or even how much it will cost to complete the
commercialization process."). Abramowicz makes this observation based on Shaun Martin and Frank
Partnoy's "Patents as Options" theory./d. at 1073 n.23 (citing Shaun Martin & Frank Partnoy, Patents
as Options, Videotape Presentation at the Washington University School of Law Conference on
Commercializing Innovation (Nov. 4, 2005), available at http://law.wustl.edu/CRIE/index.asp?id=I737).
Martin and Partnoy analogize patent rights to real options, particularly a call option- the ability to
decide at a future date to exercise the patent exclusivity option by commercializing the claimed
invention or asserting the exclusivity right via litigation. /d. at 1073-74. The Author has expanded on
this analogy. See Christopher A. Cotropia, Describing Patents as Real Options, 34 J. CoRP. L. II27
(2009)·
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back to Figure r, each dot represents a potential product configuration,
and thus a potential invention, upon which a patent may be filed. At the
beginning of the development process, the lack of information makes it
difficult to know whether a particular invention-a specific dot-will be
the one that eventually becomes commercialized. That is, whether the
invention has commercial value and, in turn, whether exclusivity over
that invention-the patent-will have value."'9 As time goes on-and
development continues-more technical and market information is
generated. This additional information reduces the uncertainty because
nonviable inventions are abandoned and those inventions that remain
are closer to commercialization, and thus their worth becomes clearer. 210
This increase in certainty with the passage of time even occurs if the
inventor stops developing. This is because invention information can
come from external sources, such as technical changes of a
complementary technology or production process or market changes due
to variations in consumer demand for the invention's technological area.
B.

COMPENSATION FOR LACK OF INFORMATION AND UNCERTAINTY BY
0VERFILING

The lack of information and great uncertainty at the early filing
stage leads to more patent applications. Given the circumstances at such
an early stage in the development cycle, inventors choose to err on the
side of filing patent applications for most inventions. This early in
development, there is uncertainty as to the possible upside of a given
invention. But failure to file early likely prohibits the inventor from ever
enjoying this, albeit probabilistic, upside. And the potential upside to
filing is compared against a small and fixed downside- the costs of filing
(attorney and filing fees), which most likely pale in comparison with the
potential value of patent exclusivity.
After deciding to file early, patent applicants continue to use the
patent system as the development process continues and new invention
information comes to light. Applicants file continuation applications to
claim different aspects of their invention that new information has
identified as commercially valuable.m Applicants also file new
applications, or continuations-in-part, as the invention evolves to include
technical aspects not originally disclosed in the earlier-filed application."
The patent rules, lack of information, and uncertainty prompt inventors
2

209. See infra Part III.C.3 for a discussion of another patent value that is independent of
commercialization- assertion against other companies.
210. Abramowicz, supra note 14, at HY75-76 ("The future, however, tends to become clearer as we
move toward it.").
211. See infra Part III.B.2.a.
212. See infra Part III.B.2.b.
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to "file early."'' 3 The additional information that is generated as time
continues creates an accompanying "file often" mentality." 4
I.
Early Decision Window Prompts Inventors to Err on the Side of
Filing
When an inventor reaches conception, the inventor is faced with a
choice. Either file for a patent with the little technical and market
information available or wait while more information becomes available
and the value of a patent right becomes more certain. The patent rules
make it risky to wait, with each additional day increasing the risk that the
inventor loses the right to her invention." 5 If she loses her patent rights
because of delaying filing, they are lost forever, and she possibly
becomes subservient to another's patent rights." 6
Add to these circumstances the fact that an inventor is unlikely to
know if others are close to inventing the same subject matter upon which
she is working. Those researching in a given field are sometimes aware of
similar researchers doing similar things." 7 But the specific act of filing a
patent application is secret." 8 An inventor does not know if someone else
has filed an application until-at the earliest-eighteen months after the
filing date when the application is published.'' 9 Such a discovery occurs
only if the inventor is actively looking."o And a discovery at this stage is,
in most cases, made too late for the inventor to take corrective action."'
The silence as to others' patenting activities can extend another year if a
provisional application was filed and could be until the application issues
if the earlier applicant elects not to publish."' The lack of knowledge also
extends to other acts that may bar the inventor's patent rights, such as an
offer for sale or publication by another that occurs after the date of
conception but more than one year before an application is filed." 3
The inventor, when making an early filing decision, not only knows
little about others' filing activities but also knows little about the
commercial value of the exclusivity a patent would provide. ''4 As
213. See infra Part ll.B.2.
214. See infra Part ll.B.2.
215. Kitch. supra note 12, at 270 ("(T]t is risky not to immediately seek a patent .... ").
216. MERGES & DUFFY, supra note 83, at 541 ("(W]hile being the first to invent creates a right to a
patent, the statutory bars can destroy the right if the inventor waits too long to file an application.").
217. See Duffy, supra note 15, at 462-63 (providing the example of multiple people racing to invent
the telegraph).
218. 35 U.S.C. § 122(a) (2006).
219. /d.§ 122(b).
220. See Mark Lemley, Ignoring Patents, 2oo8 MICH. ST. L. REv. 19, 21-22.
221. See, e.g., 35 U.S.C. § 102(a)-(b}.
222. /d.§ 122(b}(2).
223. Kitch, supra note 12, at 270 ("Since the commercial use or publication (that creates a statutory
bar] may be by others, the bar is not within the inventor's control.").
224. See id. (noting that at the early filing stage, the "practical significance of the innovation may
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discussed earlier, little information regarding the invention, particularly
market information, is required at the early filing stage. 225 This lack of
information makes the projected value of a patent incredibly uncertain.
At this early stage of development the value falls within a wide range,
with a defined floor being the cost of obtaining the patent and an almost
unlimited ceiling of the best expected profits from the exclusive sale of
the patented technology.
Faced with a choice to file early or wait, most inventors err on the
side of filing. This is the commonly accepted professional advice given to
patent practitioners. 226 The reasons behind such advice, and therefore
why most follow it, are four-fold.
First, the patent's ability to facilitate commercialization in the future
becomes more valuable the further out the time of filing is from possible
commercialization. 227 There is value in having the option to exercise
patent exclusivity in light of this uncertainty. That is, the patent leaves its
owner the option to exercise exclusivity at any time during its period of
exclusivity-if the invention's commercial value becomes clearer, the
patent is there to help make the invention profitable. 228 Abramowicz
explains that "[u]ncertainty ... makes it apparent that patents are
options, and so long as there is some chance that the option will be worth
exercising, an inventor may have an incentive to seek a patent." 229
Second, the earlier the patent right's value is examined, the greater
the range of its value. So, early in development, the possible upside is
larger, which entices more inventors to file. "[A]n inventor will
sometimes be willing to enter a patent race very early because of the
possibility that an invention will be more valuable than expected."
Professor Dennis Crouch describes a patent "lottery" effect, identifying
the large upside of the patent right, no matter how unlikely, as the
incentive to file for patent protection. This lottery effect plays a role in
230

231

232

be but dimly perceived"); supra Part III.A.3.
225. See supra Part I.A.r.
226. See, e.g., JEFFREY G. SHELDON, How TO WRITE A PATENT APPLICATION§ 1.5 (2009) ("There are
some reasons for delay in filing. It is unusual that these reasons will overcome the aforementioned
reasons for filing promptly.").
227. See NARD, supra note I23, at 30-31.
228. See Cotropia, supra note 208, at I I37 ("This exclusive use of the invention allows the
patentholder to commercialize the invention and sell it at a supra-competitive price.").
229. Abramowicz, supra note I4, at I079·
230. See William Johnson, Managing Uncertainty in Innovation: The Applicability of Both Real
Options and Path Dependency Theory, I6 CREATIVITY & INNOVATION MGMT. 274, 276 ("The further
away an opportunity is in time, the greater the options value on it will be, but the less the resources
applied to manage it.").
23 I. Abramowicz, supra note I4, at I079·
232. See Dennis D. Crouch, The Patent Lottery: Exploiting Behavioral Economics for the Common
Good, I6 GEORGE MAsoN L. REv. I4I, I42 (2oo8).
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erring on the side of filing-the inventor is focused on the upside, which
is by definition larger the earlier one files. 233
Third, the cost of filing- the downside of seeking protection- is low
compared to the potential value of the patent right. The filing fees are
small, starting at $330.00. 234 The fees even adjust based on the size of the
inventor. 235 The attorney fees are fairly low as well, with the cost for
preparing the patent application being, on average, $9412. 236 The burden
of these initial costs can be spread out over a year through the use of a
provisional application, which entails initial fees that are even lower than
a nonprovisional application. 237 With the usual delays in USPTO
examination, the inventor typically has almost two years to gather more
information on the invention's worth before outlaying more resources to
continue her pursuit of a patent application. 238 This ability to spread out
the costs of filing between a provisional application, non-provisional
application, and the different stages of prosecution lowers the cost of
filing to an inventor and allows the inventor to defer portions of the costs
until a time at which the invention's worth is more certain. There is also
the benefit that this downside is fairly certain and fixed. The inventor
knows, at the beginning, what the costs of patenting will be.
Moreover, either by not electing publication or abandoning within
eighteen months of filing, the inventor does not forgo the option of
keeping her invention secret, making the costs of filing even lower. 239
There is some risk in revealing technical information by filing and losing
trade secret protection. 240 This risk, however, can be managed by not
electing early publication and by abandoning a patent application before
issuance. 241

233. Abramowicz, supra note 14, at 1079·
234. 37 C.P.R.§ r.16(a)(1) (2oo8).
235. Small entity filing fee is $165.00. See id.
236. See AIPLA REPORT, supra note 74, at I-79 (noting the average cost for a relatively complex
mechanical invention). The cost decreases as the technical complexity decreases. See id. at I-78
(reporting the average cost for a minimally complex application to be $7012).
237. The filing fee for a provisional application is $220.00, see 37 C.P.R. § 1.16(d), and the cost of
preparation is about half that of a utility-$4384. see AIPLA REPORT. supra note 74·
238. The current average pendency before the first office action is 22.6 months. See U.S. PATENT &
TRADEMARK OFFICE, PERFORMANCE AND AccOUNTABILITY REPORT FISCAL YEAR 2006, at 21 (2007),
available at http://www.uspto.gov/web/offices/com/annuaV2oo6/50304_table4.html.
239. See 35 U.S.C. § 122 (2006).
240. See Universal Oil Prods. v. Globe Oil & Refin. Co., 322 U.S. 471, 484 (1944) ("As a reward
for inventions and to encourage their disclosure, the United States offers a seventeen-year monopoly
to an inventor who refrains from keeping his invention a trade secret.").
241. Robert M. M. Seto, A Federal Judge's View of the Most Important Change in Patent Law in
Half-a-Century, I I J. TECH. L. & PoL'Y 141, 163 (2006) ("For example, if early prosecution suggests
that a patent is too hard to obtain from the patent office, the applicant may opt to abandon the patent
application, and because the application is still secret, he can retain the trade secret and protect it from
discovery as a trade secret.").

100

HASTINGS LAW JOURNAL

[Vol. 61:65

There is even a potential upside to disclosing the invention absent
patent protection. Publication via the USPTO can negate others'
potential patent rights. 242 Hidden information usually does not qualify as
prior art and, therefore, cannot be used to invalidate another's patent. 243
Filing solves this problem by facilitating publication that, even if it does
not result in a patent, makes the invention public and clears the way for
its inventor by negating other's potential patent rights. 244 An application
that is published and then abandoned still operates to bar others from
obtaining exclusivity over the same subject matter. 245
Fourth, there is value in having a patent even if the holder never
commercializes the claimed technology or attempts to assert the patent.
Patents can be used as currency when dealing with other companies.
Patents are typically used as "barter" in licensing discussions, with the
patent providing an alternative to royalty payments to gain a license to
some other intellectual property in retum. 246 Patents can also provide a
good defense against others asserting intellectual property. Patenting in
certain industries is viewed as a means to create and maintain a mutually
assured destruction arrangement.'47 It is not uncommon for all of the
players in a given industry to amass patent rights in order to maintain a
position where if one company asserts its patents against another, there
will be an equal volley of patents in retum. 248 Patents are also sold or
even donated for tax-write-off purposes. 249
Patents also have value in numbers. Gideon Parchomovsky and
Polk Wagner recently documented the fact that patenting sometimes
occurs not because of the individual patent's worth, but because of the
value of the patent in combination with other patents. 250 The mere fact a
patent is in a given technical area-even if the patent claims a technology
that is not of much value by itself- helps strengthen other patents held in
242. See, e.g., 35 U.S.C. § 102(a).
243. Cf id. § 102(g).
244. See Gideon Parchomovsky, Publish or Perish, 98 MICH. L. REv. 926, 928 (2000) ("From a
practical standpoint, the strategy of preemptive publication is made possible by the lag that exists
between the time a finn obtains sufficient research results to effect a change in the prior art and the
time it perfects the invention.").
245. See 35 U.S.C. § ro2(e).
246. Ronald J. Mann, Do Patents Facilitate Financing in the Software Industry?, 83 TEx. L. REv.
961,990 (2005).
247. /d. at 990-91; Parchomovsky & Wagner, supra note 8, at 26-27 (describing defensive
patenting strategy); see Bronwyn H. Hall & Rosemarie Ham Ziedonis, The Patent Paradox Revisited:
An Empirical Study of Patenting in the U.S. Semiconductor Industry, I979-I995, 32 RAND J. EcoN.
101, 104, 125 (2001).
248. Mann, supra note 246, at 990-91.
249. See Xuan-Thao Nguyen & Jeffry A. Maine, Giving Intellectual Property, 39 U.C. DAVIS L.
REv. 1721, 1739 (2oo6). The benefit of such donations has decreased due to legislation. /d. at 1748-49·
250. Parchomovsky & Wagner, supra note 8, at 31-42 (articulating the benefits to either scale- or
diversity-based patent portfolios).
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that same technical area and, in turn, strengthens the patent holder's
position in the related industry. 251
Accordingly, when these costs and benefits are weighed, most
inventors err on the side of filing early. To be sure, not everyone errs on
the side of filing early. The less sophisticated inventor may lack the
knowledge of the patent system to understand it is in her best interests to
file early, or she may not have quick and easy access to the resources and
assistance needed to file an application. But most companies who invent
have the sophistication and the infrastructure in place to exercise the
option to file early and avoid losing patent exclusivity over the invention.
For these patent players, the system pushes them to file first and ask
questions later.
2.
The "File Early, File Often" Mentality
After an inventor files early, she gains more information about her
invention. The development process, shown in Figure r above, marches
on. Further invention information is either generated internally, through
the ongoing technical definition of the invention or from market
research, or externally, through changes in complementary technologies,
technological processes, or market information. 252 Patent law allows the
inventor to use this information to further shape her exclusive rights over
the invention. 253 She can ask for additional patent protection and utilize
this new information when drafting new patent claims. 254 The ability to
file for additional protection gives an inventor the ability to "file often."
And inventors do file often by supplementing their initial filings with
continuations or continuations-in-part, or by filing new applications
altogether. 255
a. Continuations
Under the current patent system, the applicant always has the right
to "continue" the prosecution of her patent application. 256 This means
that even after a patent examiner has issued a "final rejection" of a
patent application's claims, the applicant can file a continuation
251. /d. at 37 ("In an environment where individual patents are increasingly of questionable value,
it is the patent portfolio that is assuming the role of providing meaningful patent-type protection in the
modem marketplace.").
252. See supra Part III.A.
253. See supra Part III.A.
254. See supra Part III.A.2.
255. Cecil D. Quillen, Jr. eta!., Continuing Patent Applications and Performance of the U.S. Patent
and Trademark Office-Extended, 12 FED. OR. B.J. 35, 38 (2002) (noting that these follow-up
applications make up a significant percentage of pending patent applications).
256. 35 U.S.C. § 120 (2006); Mark A. Lemley & Kimberley A. Moore, Ending Abuse of Patent
Continuations, 84 B.U. L. REv. 63, 67-69 (2004) (explaining the continuation process). A special form
of continuation, a request for continued examination, works in a similar way to a continuation. See 35
U.S.C. § 132(b).
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application to try again and get patent protection for the invention. 257 The
filing of a continuation can also occur when the examiner eventually
allows claims in the original application, potentially amended to respond
to an initial rejection, or the applicant expressly abandons all of the
claims in the original application. 25 One of the main reasons behind filing
a continuation application is the ability to include new patent claims that
capture different aspects of the invention. 259 While the new claims must
be supported by the original application, 200 the new claims can recite
aspects of the invention not originally claimed or vary the level of
specificity of what is claimed in contrast to the original clairns. 26 '
When an inventor learns about another technical aspect of an
invention that is important or becomes aware that a certain variation of
the invention is commercially advantageous, the inventor can include
claims to cover this new information in the application. These new claims
can be included in the original application via an amendment. But, in
most cases, applicants introduce such new claims in a continuation. 262 The
new information prompts a new filing-the filing of a continuation
application.
New information about a competitor's use of the invention also
prompts the filing of continuations. A common use of a continuation
application is to draft claims that cover an embodiment of the invention
being used by a competitor that becomes known after the initial filing. 263
The ability to continue to define new patent protection encourages
most inventors to always keep a continuation of an originally filed
application on file. 264 As long as the applications overlap in their
pendency, the applicant can include any claims that are originally
supported. 265 The pending applications give an applicant the option of
getting patent protection at any time and getting protection that is
257. See 37 C.P.R. § I.II3 (2008) (defining a final rejection); Lemley & Moore, supra note 256, at
64.
258. Lemley & Moore, supra note 256, at 67-69.
259. There are other reasons, such as trying to convince the examiner to allow an already filed set
of patent claims. /d. at 64.
260. See 35 U.S.C. § 120; Vas-Cath Inc. v. Mahurkar, 935 F.2d 1555, 156o (Fed. Cir. 1991) (noting
that newly added claims must be described and enabled by the original specification).
26r. See Mark A. Lemley & Carl Shapiro, Probabilistic Patents, 19 J. EcoN. PERSPECf!VES, Spring
2005, at 75, 81-82 ("Two of the most common practices used by patentees to increase their chances of
winning the patent lottery are continuations and a proliferation of closely related patents.").
262. See Lemley & Moore, supra note 256, at 64.
263. See, e.g., Gentry Gallery, Inc. v. Berkline Corp., 134 F.3d 1473, 1479 (Fed. Cir. 1998) ("[The
patentholder] admitted at trial that he did not consider placing the controls outside the console until
he became aware that some of Gentry's competitors were so locating the recliner controls.").
264. Lemley & Moore, supra note 256, at 81 ("In some industries, notably biotechnology and
pharmaceuticals, firms typically keep a continuation application pending during the entire lifetime of
the original patent.").
265. See 35 U.S.C. § 120.
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tailored to what the applicant or a competitor is doing.'66 That is, there is
always an application on file where the applicant can apply new
information she learns either internally or externally. z(ry Thus, applicants
"file often" by habitually filing continuations. This tendency is a direct
response to the fact that original filing occurs so early, with so little
invention information.
b. Continuations-in-Part and New Applications
Another option the inventor has is to file a new application when
new information is produced. This usually takes the form of a
"continuation-in-part" -where a new filing overlaps with an originally
filed application but contains a new "invention" in that there are
additions to the disclosure that were not originally described in enough
detail to meet the written description and enablement requirements to
patentability. 268 These continuations-in-part do not enjoy the original
application's filing date for the newly added material because these new
parts of the disclosure were technically invented after the filing date. 269
The common continuation-in-part situation is an improvement to the
original invention.
By filing a continuation-in-part, or a new application, the applicant
can capture follow-on inventions that she develops after the early filing
date. The patentability of these improvements is limited by the original
patent application, which is now potential prior art. However, the
ability to file a continuation in part or new application demonstrates
another way in which the patent system allows an inventor to
compensate for information she lacked at the time of filing by filing for
more patent protection when new information comes to light. Put
another way, an inventor can also "file often" by filing a continuation in
part or new application, both of which build off the original application
and initial invention.
270

27

c.

'

EARLY FILING EXACERBATES THE PATENT SYSTEM'S PROBLEMS

Early filing and the overfiling it causes contribute to the recently
identified ills of the patent system. By forcing inventors to err on the side
of filing early and then following up with filing often, the early-filing
system overloads the examination process and increases the ever266. See id.
267. See id.
268. In re Klein, 5 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) 259 (Comm'r Pat. 1930).
269. See, e.g., PowerOasis, Inc. v. T-Mobile USA, Inc., 522 F.3d 1299, 131o-II (Fed. Cir. 2008)
(limiting the continuation-in-part's claims that are not supported by the earlier disclosure to the
continuation-in-pan's filing date).
270. See 35 U.S.C. § 102.
271. These are all typically considered to be of the same "family" of patents.
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expanding population of issued patents. The problems created continue
because the earlier the patent is filed in the development cycle, the
greater the likelihood that the issued patents are never developed. 272
These circumstances incentivize patent holders to become "patent trolls"
because it is cheaper to enforce an early-filed patent than it is to
commercialize it. 273 Early filing also increases the likelihood that the
boundaries the patent defines are unclear due to the lack of inventionspecific information available in such early filed patents. 274 While these
are all problems in their own right, they also directly undermine the
previously articulated benefits to early filing.
I.
Early Filing Encourages Additional Applications and Additional
Patents
The early-filing doctrine results in more applications being filed. As
described above, at the early filing stage, most inventors err on the side
of filing patent applicationS. 275 Inventions that have some commercial
potential, regardless of how remote, are claimed in patent applications. 276
This includes inventions that, if filing decisions were made later in the
development process, would not be converted into patent applications
because, at this later time, they clearly lack value. And the earlier filing
occurs, the more product configurations are in the mix upon which
patent applications cail be filed. As shown in Figure 1, there are just
more potential products to patent early in the development process. 277
All of these factors combine to create more patent applications than if
patenting was decided later in the development process.
In addition to these initial filings are the numerous follow-on
filings. 278 As new information about an invention surfaces, an inventor
files more applications. These additional applications take the form of
continuations, continuations-in-part, or new applications. The early-filing
doctrine not only adds additional original applications on the front endwhere applications are filed to play it safe- but the doctrine also causes
more applications to be filed during the prosecution of the original
application to make up for the lack of information on the front-end.
The problem with these additional applications is that they
contribute to an overloaded patent examination system. One of the
major causes of the issuance of "bad patents" -patents covering
inventions that are actually unpatentable-is the USPTO's inability to

272.
273.
274.
275.
276.
277.
278.

See supra Part III.B. 1.
See supra Part III. B. 1.
See supra Part LA. I.
See supra Part III.B. 1.
See supra Part III.B. 1.
See supra Part III.A.
See supra Part III.B.2.
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thoroughly examine each application. 279 The number of patent
applications is rising exponentially each year while, at the same time, the
USPTO faces a significant examiner attrition rate. 8o Examiners are thus
given very little time to perform a complete examination and determine
whether the claimed invention is patentable. 28 ' The addition of more
patent applications because of the early-filing doctrine adds to the
overload problem, causing examiners to spend even less time on each
application and, as a result, do a worse job of weeding out applications
for unpatentable inventions.
More applications also means more patents issued. Early filing has
the same multiplier effect on issued patents as it does on filed ones. Not
only are marginally-valuable patents filed and then issued, early filing on
even valuable patents prompts "make-up" filing later in the process, with
continuations and new applicationS. 282 These follow-on filings add even
more issued patents to the mix. Where there may have been only one
patent issued for a given product, applicants seek-and get-multiple
patents to compensate for the lack of information early in the
development process. 283
The high volume of issued patents creates problems of its own. The
more patents there are, the more likely there will be patent thicketsareas of technology encumbered by numerous patents on various aspects
of the technology. 284 The number of thicket situations increases when
patents are issued from continuations or continuations in part since these
types of filings, by definition, cover the same general invention but with a
2

279. See Doug Lichtman & Mark A. Lemley, Rethinking Patent Law's Presumption of Validity, 6o
STAN. L. REv. 45, 46-47 (2007) (identifying the resource problem faced by the USPTO to effectively
review the growing number of applications); John R. Thomas, Collusion and Collective Action in the
Patent System: A Proposal for Patent Bounties, 2001 U. ILL. L. REv. 304, 314 ("[T)he average time
allocated for an examiner to address one application is understood to be between sixteen and
seventeen hours. Given the complexities involved in parsing an application, conducting a prior art
search and drafting an Office Action, this period is surprisingly short.").
280. See Beth Simone Noveck, "Peer to Patent": Collective Intelligence, Open Review, and Patent
Reform, 20 HARV. J.L. & TECH. 123, 132 (2006) ("[T)he USPTO still cannot hire quickly enough to
keep pace with both the demands of the job and the attrition rate.").
281. Thomas, supra note 279 (noting that examiners are allotted sixteen to seventeen hours per
application).
282. See supra Part III.B.2.
283. See, e.g., Parchomovsky & Wagner, supra note 8, at 31-42 (discussing the prevalence of
"scale" portfolios).
284. Carl Shapiro, Navigating the Patent Thicket: Cross Licenses, Patent Pools, and Standard
Setting, in I INNOVATION POLICY AND THE EcoNOMY II9, I2I (Adam B. Jaffe et al. eds., 2001) ("(O)ur
patent system, while surely a spur to innovation overall, is in danger of imposing an unnecessary drag
on innovation by enabling multiple rights owners to 'tax' new products, processes, and even business
methods."); Michael A. Heller & Rebecca S. Eisenberg, Can Patents Deter Innovation? The
Anticommons in Biomedical Research, 280 SciENCE 698, 698-99 (1998) (arguing that an increase in
private intellectual property rights in biomedical research may reduce the total amount of such
research}.
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varying set of claims.'85 Sheer numbers of patents also make it tough for
competitors to digest even unrelated patents.'86 High numbers also allow
patent holders to easily overwhelm competitors or potential licensees,
making it difficult for such targets to properly evaluate the patents' worth
or defend against them in litigation.'87
Since these patents are issued from an overburdened USPTO, some
of the patents will be invalid ones. Issuance of these bad patents, in
addition to creating the problems mentioned above, comes with its own
set of harms. A bad patent, for example, may give its holder exclusive
control over a minor technological advance, creating roadblocks to
innovation that are typically not permitted under patent law.'88 Since
even poor-quality patents enjoy a presumption of validity, the patentee
can threaten to stop others from practicing what they rightfully can do or
she can seek licensing fees for activities that are actually allowable.'89 The
bad patents create in terrorem effects, deterring socially acceptable and
beneficial behavior."J!' Those who want to use the patented technology
must expend significant resources to determine whether the patent is
invalid and, if forced, spend money to legally establish this fact.
A final problem with early filing increasing the number of
applications and overburdening the patent application process is that this
situation delays the expiration of filed patents. More applications not
only causes poor examination, it also leads to a delay in examination.
The explosion of applications is identified by many as causing the everincreasing delay in USPTO action on pending applications.'9' While the
patent term is measured from the time of filing,' 9' delays in prosecution
caused by the USPTO do not reduce the patent term. The patent system
"credits" the patentee for such delays, increasing the patent term in
proportion to the delays caused by the USPT0.' 93 This means that delays
caused by an increase in applications because of the early filing doctrine

285. Lemley & Shapiro, supra note 261, at 81-82.
286. See Parchomovsky & Wagner, supra note 8, at 35-36.
287. !d.
288. See MERGES & DuFFY, supra note 83, at 647; Cotropia, supra note 86, at 1525 ("Exclusive
control over these minor developments would act as roadblocks, creating disincentives to future
inventors. Many patents on small technical advances make it extremely difficult and 'expensive to
search and to license' these patents in order to produce further innovations.").
289. See Lichtman & Lemley, supra note 279, at 47 (noting that the presumption of validity makes
"defendants face an uphill battle persuading the courts to overrule that errant determination.").
290. See John R. Thomas, The Responsibility of the Rulemaker: Comparative Approaches to Patent
Administrative Reform, 17 BERKELEY TECH L.J. 727,731 (2002) (detailing these detrimental effects).
291. See Jason J. Chung, Note, Patent Pendency Problems and Possible Solutions to Reducing
Patent Pendency at the United States Patent and Trademark Office, 90 J. PAT. & TRADEMARK OFF. Soc'y
58, 63 (zooS).
292. 35 U.S.C. § 154(a)(2) (zoo6).
293. See id. § 154(b) (establishing the adjustment of the patent term due to USPTO delays).
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extend the time period between patent filing and patent expiration. 294 A
delayed patent expires later, beyond the traditional twenty years from
the filing date. 295
This de facto increase in patent term due to early filing negates the
socially-beneficial gains of early filing identified by Duffy. Duffy views
early expiration as a benefit to early filing. 296 Because of the overload
early filing puts on the USPTO, early filing does not necessarily lead to
early expiration. It is true that the early filing doctrine leads to the patent
getting filed earlier, and the expiration clock starting to tick earlier. But
the delays early filing creates at the USPTO lengthen the patent term,
causing expiration and public dedication to happen later. If the delays
become long enough, the credited time may be sufficient to, on net, lead
to later expiration of the earlier-filed patent than if the patent was filed
later. This problem-contributed to by overfiling-counteracts any gains
in earlier patent expiration allegedly created by the early-filing doctrine.
2.
Early Filing Leads to Underdevelopment of Patented
Technologies
More patents filed, examined, and issued is not necessarily a bad
thing. Patent theory presumes that a socially-beneficial product or
technology accompanies each issued patent-'97 This is the exchange
society obtains-a new and non-obvious technology in return for the
grant of a limited period of exclusivity. 9ll If the early-filing doctrine leads
to more of a good thing-that is, more technological progress-then the
extra applications are not a concern. The problem is that the earlier a
patent is filed in the development cycle, the less likely the covered
invention is ever commercialized.
2

294. See Posting of Dennis Crouch to Patently-0, Extending the Patent Term: Most Patents Are
Extended Due to PTO Delay, http://www.patentlyo.corn!patent/2oo8/o3/extending-the-p.html (Mar.
14, 2008, 13:00 CDT) (establishing that most patent terms are extended due to USPTO delays).
295. See 35 U.S.C. § 154(b).
296. See supra Part II. C.
297. See Mazer v. Stein, 347 U.S. 201, 219 (1954) ("The economic philosophy behind the clause
empowering Congress to grant patents and copyrights is the conviction that encouragement of
individual effort by personal gain is the best way to advance public welfare through the talents of
authors and inventors in 'Science and useful Arts.") (quoting U.S. CaNST. art. I,§ 8)).
There are other theories as to the ultimate value of patents. Patents facilitate the disclosure of
inventions, and the disclosures add to the public knowledge. See Rebecca S. Eisenberg, Patents and the
Progress of Science: Exclusive Rights and Experimental Use, 56 U. CHI. L. REv. 1017, 1028 (1989)
("The incentive to disclose argument, which has been more popular with the courts than with
commentators, rests on the premise that in the absence of patent protection inventors would keep
their inventions secret in order to prevent competitors from exploiting them. Secrecy prevents the
public from gaining the full benefit of new knowledge and leads to wasteful duplicative research.").
298. See NARD, supra note 123, at 3o--31 (noting patent law's role "in inducing the transformation
of inventions into downstream, commercialized products").
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First, the earlier an application is filed, the more likely the
application is filed on an invention that is never commercialized. As
previously mentioned, and graphically depicted in Figure r, many early
technological ideas turn out to be technically unfeasible or commercially
worthless and therefore are never commercialized. 299 Inventors still file
applications on these early ideas because, at the early stages, they all
have commercial potential. As time goes by, and development continues,
the inventor figures out which inventions-and thus which patents-are
still commercially viable and which are not. And the earlier the filing, the
more inventions that are inevitably not commercialized make their way
into the USPTO, are examined, and become the subject of issued
patents. 300
Viewing patents as options-specifically options to commercializefurther drives this point home. Patent rights can be analogized to real
options, and particularly to a call option. Thus the patent provides the
ability to decide at a future date to exercise the patent exclusivity option
to gain the exclusive right to commercialize the claimed invention. 301
Patents have an exercise price3" -the cost of commercialization-and a
purchase price-the cost of filing of a patent application and the
accompanying development needed to qualify for patent protection. 303 A
patent can therefore be depicted graphically as a call option, as shown
below in Figure 2.
2

299. See supra Part liLA.
300. See supra Part III.B.I.
301. Cotropia, supra note 208, at 1134 ("Many have made the general analogy-describing in
broad terms how operationally a patent, particularly the accompanying right to exclude and the
predefined patent term, behaves like a real option."); see Abramowicz, supra note 14, at 1073 n.23
(citing Martin & Pamoy, supra note 2o8).
302. The exercise price is "the amount of money invested to exercise the option if you are 'buying'
the asset (with a call option)." ToM CoPELAND & VLADIMIR ANTIKARov, REAL OPTioNs: A
PRACfiTIONER'S GUIDE 6 (2003).
303. See Co tropia, supra note 208, at 1135-39 (describing in detail the components of the exercise
and purchase price of a patent option).
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FIGURE 2: PATENT AS CALL OPTION

Option
Price

Value of Patent Right (Right to Exclude)
The initial value of the option is negative given that there is a
purchase price for a patent-a combination of the cost of filing and the
development expenditures needed to meet the patent requirements. 304
Once filed, the potential value cannot go lower than the purchase price?05
The option's upper value is defined by the value of having exclusive
rights to commercialize the patented invention. 300 This value is not
realized until the option-the patent-is exercised by using the patent's
exclusivity to assist in the commercialization of the underlying
invention?''7
Since the patent system requires only conception and the drafting of
a patent application, the purchase of a patent option is relatively
inexpensive. 3o8 In contrast, the potential value of the option at this early
stage is quite high due to the lack of information about the invention and
the accompanying uncertainty. As mentioned above, this is the
combination that makes the filing of an application-the purchase of the
patent option- too good a deal to pass up. 309 And since there are so many

304. See id. at II35-37·
305. See id.
306. Id. at II37-38. As time passes, the value becomes more identifiable. See Abramowicz, supra
note 14, at 1091.
307· See Cotropia, supra note 208, at II37-38 (identifying this commercial way to exercise a patent
option); Dam, supra note 124, at 247 (noting that patent exclusivity allows the patentee to
commercialize at a price to recoup research and development costs).
308. See Abramowicz, supra note 14, at 1091 ("When patenting is relatively inexpensive, it may be
worthwhile to obtain a patent even when the chances that the patent will be practical to develop are
very low."); Cotropia, supra note 2o8, at r 135-37 (describing the low option price of a patent right).
309· See supra Part Ill.B.I.
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potential ideas available at the early filing stage, there are more
options-more patentable inventions-purchased. As time passes, the
true value of the option-the value of commercialization-becomes
clearer and some options will turn out not to be worth exercising. An
unexercised patent option is a patented invention that is not
commercialized. 3' Therefore, looking at patents as options provides
another description as to why early filing leads to more
underdevelopment of patented inventions. Essentially, early filing leads
to more bets-option purchases by way of patent filings-that go bad
and have no payout because they cover inventions not worth
commercializing. Thus, inventors may fold- they choose not to
commercialize.
There is another reason why early filing leads to underdevelopment
of patented inventions. Early filing creates a situation where few
resources are required to file a patent application and, in contrast, much
more resources are required to commercialize the patented invention.
The patent system does not require much development prior to filing and
so, after filing, the inventor has a long way to go to commercialization. 3"
As Figure I demonstrates, there are usually many stages to new product
development, where both technical and market information is generated
in order to identify the product configuration truly worthy of
commercialization. 3 ' Since patenting happens at an early development
stage, there is a long way to go until commercial launch of the patented
invention.
This situation can be recharacterized under the patents as real
options theory. The lower the purchase price of the patent option-that
is, the less development needed to file a valid application- the higher the
exercise price- the cost of commercialization.3' 3 Since there is little
invested in the front end (i.e., the option's price was low), exercising the
option is a bigger step than it would be if the option was purchased later
in the development cycle and there were already more sunk development
costs. Figure 3, below, represents this relationship graphically. The less
development needed to file for a patent, the more the exercise cost will
be.
0

2

310. See infra Part III.C.3.
31 r. See supra Part I.A.r.
312. See supra Part III.A.r.
313. See Abramowicz, supra note 14, at 1o83 ("Imposing minimal requirements for obtaining a
patent will decrease both the price of the patent option and the chance that the option will never be
exercised.").

November 2009]

THE FOLLY OF EARLY FILING

III

FIGURE 3: TIME OF FILING AND EXERCISE PRICE

Development
Investment at Early

Filing

Value of Patent Right (Right to Exclude)
The problem with these circumstances is that they lead to even less
commercialization of patented inventions. Since the early filing system
requires little buy-in on the front end, patent holders are not as invested
in the claimed technologies, and so they are less interested in
commercializing. 3 ' 4 At the very least, they will wait longer from the time
of filing before they develop the technology, as compared to if they had
paid more for the option initially. 3 ' 5 Commercialization appears as a high
hurdle compared to the initial investment to get the patent. Abramowicz
comes to a similar conclusion, working through proofs to establish that,
when taking uncertainty into account, the earlier in the development
process a patent is obtained, the more likely the invention is never
developed. 3 ' 6
A third reason early filing increases the likelihood of
underdevelopment is the management perspective problem early filing
creates. The further away the ultimate benefit (i.e., commercialization) is
from an initial purchase (i.e., the filing of the patent), "the less the
resources applied to manage it." 3 '; That is, management is more likely to
ignore, and in turn devote less energy to pursuing, long-term interests. 3 ' 8

314. /d.
315. /d.
316. /d. at 1090.
317. Johnson, supra note 230, at 276.

318. Abramowicz makes an additional argument that supports the conclusion that early filing leads
to underdevelopment. He argues that the earlier the filing, the more likely a patent holder will wait
longer to commercialize and, in the end, possibly never commercialize. See Abramowicz, supra note
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The patented invention, or at least patent protection, is more likely to be
forgotten the further patenting is from the end goal of
commercialization.
This underdevelopment of patented invention, for the reasons
articulated, can have serious consequences because it can only hamper,
as opposed to promote, technological progress. These patents, by
definition, cover technologies that are commercially worthless in the eyes
of their owners and do not generate a social benefit on their own. But
they still drag down the development of other technologies. They
contribute to the patent thicket situation already discussed, creating
roadblocks to innovation. 3 ' 9 A competitor does not know, without some
investigation, that the patent does not specifically exclude the technology
he is pursuing. 320 Accordingly, these early-filed and undeveloped patents
do little more than generate costs to other developers. 32 '
Uncommercialized patents also fuel the use of patents as a litigation
tool. As observed by Shaun Martin and Frank Partnoy, it is much
cheaper to exercise the patent option by litigating as opposed to
commercializing because litigation is cheaper to initiate and has less of a
downside than commercial development. 322 Such litigation is discussed in
more detail below-usually viewed as patent-troll litigation where a
noncommercializer seeks rents from others. 323 Using a patent to simply
generate rents as opposed to commercialize is viewed as socially negative
behavior. 324 The early-filing doctrine facilitates this situation by creating a
host of patents that are unlikely to be, and too costly to be,
commercialized.
Finally, the overfiling of these patents, also caused by the earlyfiling doctrine, simply magnifies the number of undeveloped patents.
While continuations and new applications are filed later, and are
therefore more likely to be commercialized, some still necessarily go

I4, at I09Q-9I. Abramowicz observes that, while each year without commercializing loses the patentee
potential profit, the additional year also begets more information and more certainty as to the
potential commercial worth of the invention. /d. Abramowicz notes that choosing to wait can continue
until the patent expires, and in tum the option to develop expires. /d. While this may be the case, it
seems unlikely that since patents give the holder the option to delay commercialization, the patent
holder will delay past the inherent optinmm time to commercialize. That is, when the invention
becomes beneficial to commercialize, the patent holder will commercialize even if they could wait
longer. See id.
3I9. See supra Part III.C.I.
320. See supra Part III.C. 1.
32 I. See supra Part Ill. C. 1.
322. See Martin & Partnoy, supra note 2o8; see also Cotropia, supra note 208, at I I38-39, I I47
(furthering this discussion).
323. See infra Part III.C.3.
324. See infra Part III.C.3.
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undeveloped. These additional patents generate even more waste and
negative impact on society.
The patent system attempts to counteract underdevelopment by
reducing remedies available for patents that are not commercialized by
their owners.3' 5 This is unlikely to deter the increase in initial, early filings
that leads to undeveloped patents. When filing, the inventor is unsure
about commercialization and thus values the patent as including the
possibility of commercialization and the accompanying full enforcement
to protect that commercialization. This valuation may be discounted
slightly by a possible reduction in remedies, but such a change on the
very back end is unlikely to influence the front-end analysis. Such lack of
devaluation is particularly true when considered in light of all of the
uncertainty surrounding the decision to file early in the development
process.
This result from early filing-underdevelopment of the patented
technology-directly negates one of the benefits of early filing
articulated by Kitch. Kitch viewed early filing as one of the ways patents
acted as prospects and, in turn, promoted commercialization. 32 For a
good number of patents, early filing is more likely to have the opposite
effect. Patents go uncommercialized because they were filed on
inventions that are not worthy of commercialization. Patent holders are
less likely to commercialize because commercialization is comparatively
more costly. And given the distance between early filing and
commercialization, patent holders are less likely to pay close enough
attention to commercial prospects. In contrast, early filed patents are
more likely to be used in litigation as opposed to development. All of
these insights comment on the actions of the patent holder-the
technology manager under Kitch's analysis 327 -and how she acts in the
face of uncertainty and little initial investment in, or information on, the
invention's commercialization and commercial value.
3· Early Filing Fosters Patent Trolls
The early filing doctrine, by prompting overfiling and
underdevelopment, fosters patent trolls. Individuals who seek to develop
a given technological solution are pushed to file early-shortly after
conception-and then most likely do not devote the resources to
commercialize the patented technology for the reasons articulated
above. 3' 8 These unused patents can create problems. Instead of letting the
patent sit dormant, the inventor, or someone who purchases the patent,

325.
326.
327.
328.

See, e.g., eBay, Inc. v. MercExchange, LLC, 547 U.S. 388, 389-90 (2006).
Kitch, supra note 12, at 266.
/d. at 276.
See supra Part III.C.2.
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is likely to take the lower-cost avenue of asserting the patent in litigation
to extract rents from those who have commercialized in the patented
area. Put another way, the patent system's early-filing doctrine causes
inventors to file and, when the patent issues, the patent is more likely to
be asserted for litigation purposes as opposed to commercialized. 329
Those who use the patent to simply extract rents, as opposed to clear
commercialization space, are labeled "patent trolls.'mo
Early filing produces more applications and, in tum, more patents.
These additional patents, particularly those filed early in the
development cycle, are rarely developed fully. This lack of development
is sometimes due to the high cost of commercialization compared to the
low initial investment in patenting. 331 Martin and Partnoy recognized that
there is a cheaper exercise price for the patent option-asserting the
patent right against someone else.332 They note that litigating is cheaper
than commercialization. 333 There is less risk as well, given that the only
downside to litigating is attorney fees and losing the patent as compared
to being burdened with sunk costs and fixed resources tailored to a
possibly unprofitable commercial product or process. 334 This comparative
cost advantage to litigating prompts more patent holders to exercise their
patent options by asserting the patent in litigation as opposed to
commercializing. This comparison is depicted below in Figure 4, with
assertion having a lower exercise price than commercialization. 335

329. Cotropia, supra note 208, at I I38--39, I I47; Martin & Partnoy, supra note 208.
330. Brenda Sandburg, Trolling for Dollars, RECORDER (S.F.), July 30, 200I, at I (describing the

term as defined by its creator, Peter Detkin, then assistant general counsel for Intel Corporation).
33 r. See Martin & Partnoy, supra note 208; see also Co tropia, supra note 208, at rr38--39, II47
(identifying assertion as an alternative way to exercise a patent option).
332. Supra note 33 r.
333· Martin & Partnoy, supra note 208; see Cotropia, supra note 2o8, at I I38--39 (noting that the
difference may be even greater, given that commercialization may involve the additional cost of
assertion because "some level of assertion of the patent right may be required to keep the market
clear for the patentee's product").
334· See Cotropia, supra note 208, at I I38--39.
335· The value of the option may be less when it is exercised through assertion as opposed to
commercialization, but not in all cases.
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This type of activity, fostered by the early filing doctrine, is the
behavior that defines the patent troll. The term "patent troll" includes
"somebody who tries to make a lot of money off a patent that they are
not practicing and have no intention of practicing and in most cases
never practiced. "336 A "patent troll" is a patent holder that does not
produce anything related to the patent she holds. 337 The troll is not using
the patent to protect her own manufacturing efforts. 338 Trolls also rarely
perform much research and development themselves. 339 They basically do
not participate in the marketplace. 340 Instead, patent trolls use their
patents to obtain value by licensing the patent to those who have already
begun production of the manufactured technology. 341 The patent is
simply a revenue stream generator. This definition lines up with what
most early filers, or the purchasers of early filed patents, are likely to do
with their patents-assert the patent instead of commercialize it.
Patent trolls are generally frowned upon because they act as only
"tollkeeper[s]" on the road of innovation. 342 They tax innovation by

336. Sandburg, supra note 330.
337· See, e.g., Robert P. Merges, Introductory Note to Brief of Amicus Curiae in eBay v.
MercExchange, 21 BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 997, 997 (2006).
338. Jeremiah Chan & Matthew Fawcett, Footsteps of the Patent Troll, IO INTELL. PROP. L. BuLL. I,
5 (zoos).
339· Merges, supra note 337·
340. Jason Rantanen, Slaying the Troll: Litigation as an Effective Strategy Against Patent Threats,
23 SANTA CLARA CoMPUTER & HIGH TECH. L.J. 159, 160 (2006).
341. Chan & Fawcett, supra note 338, at 5·
342. Merges & Nelson, supra note ns, at 907 (using the term "tollkeeper" to identify a patentee
that does not assist the real-world development of the invention but simply takes license revenue for
that development).
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extracting licensing revenue without giving anything back in return. 343
Because patent trolls have no intention of developing or assisting in the
development of the technology covered by the patents they hold, they
provide no benefit to society. Instead, "[b ]y acquiring [patent] claims and
threatening or pursuing litigation, the patent trolls seek and often receive
economic settlements from genuine innovators and producers that
greatly exceed the true economic value of the patents in question." 344
This goal is characterized as "harmful rent-seeking." 345
The fostering of patent trolls further rebuts the alleged
commercialization advantages of the early filing doctrine. Not only does
early filing fail to result in commercialization of the patented invention, it
also promotes the anticommercial use of patents as litigation instruments
and nothing more.
4· Early Filing Contributes to Unclear Patent Boundaries
The early-filing doctrine also leads to unclear patent boundaries.
The scope of patent protection is defined by patent claims. The
interpretation of these claims is a major part of any patent evaluation or
enforcement. 346 As I have argued before, determining the exact contours
of these boundaries presents an information cost problem. 347 That is, even
if the specific interpretation methodology being used is clearly defined,
determining claim meaning still involves obtaining, understanding, and
using invention-specific information. 348
At the early-filing stage, there is a minimal amount of technical and
market information about the invention. This dearth of information
impacts the patent application. The components that traditionally aid in
the definition of the patent claims-particularly the specification and
embodiments and drawings contained therein-are not robust because of
this lack of invention-specific information. This lack of information
affects the claim interpretation process-making it difficult for the
USPTO, courts, and other patent players to determine the definitive
scope of patent protection.349
The need to file early also prompts the inventor to intentionally
draft the patent application, including the patent specification and
343· See Brief of Amicus Curiae Yahoo! Inc. in Support of Petitioner at 2-3, eBay Inc. v.
MercExchange, LLC, 547 U.S. 1015 (2006) (No. 05-130).
344· /d. at 6-7.
345· Michael J. Meurer, Controlling Opportunistic and Anti-Competitive Intellectual Property
Litigation, 44 B.C. L. REv. 509, 509 (2003).
346. See Christopher A. Cotropia, Patent Claim Interpretation Methodologies and Their Claim
Scope Paradigms, 47 WM. & MARY L. REV. 49, 65-69 (2005).
347· See Christopher A. Cotropia, Patent Claim Interpretation and Information Costs, 9 LEWIS &
L. REv. 57, 59-6o (2005).
348. /d. at C)0--91.
349· /d. at 77-81.
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claims, in vague and general terms. The specification needs to be
intentionally general so that it can support later-filed continuations. 350
These continuations, filed to capture later-developed information, do not
enjoy the filing date of the original application unless the earlier
specification supports the new claims.35 ' The inventor needs to draft the
original specification in such a way so that she can argue that the newly
filed claims were invented at the original specification's filing date. The
more general and vague the original disclosure is, the more likely support
is found. By drafting in vague and general terms, the applicant is
leveraging off of the skill in the art and reasonable experimentation to fill
the gaps of the nonspecific disclosure. This gives her flexibility when later
articulating the invention that was earlier disclosed. 352 Early filing
prompts this type of vague specification because the applicant knows that
she will have to fill holes with continuations later and she needs support
for these continuations in the original application.
Early filing encourages general and vague patent claims in another
manner as well. When drafting patent claims early in the technological
development process, the applicant does not know the specific "shelf
space" she will need. 353 She does not know what claim protection is most
valuable. Broad claims allow her to hedge her bet-it is more likely that
the most valuable commercial form of the invention falls into a broad
claim as opposed to a more specific claim.354 This need for vague claims
also aids an applicant in the most likely use for an early filed patentassertion in litigation. Broadly worded, unclear claims help in
negotiations because they both appear to capture more subject matter
and make it more difficult for the opposing party to value the litigation
claims or the patent itself. 355 Patent trolls are often said to intentionally
seek "to acquire broad and nebulous patent claims that arguably

350. See supra Part III.B.2.
351. 35 u.s.c. § 120 (2000).
352. See, e.g., Vas-Cath, Inc. v. Mahurkar, 935 F.2d 1555, 1564-65 (Fed. Cir. 1991) (holding that
drawings from a design patent can support, and give an earlier filing date to, a later filed utility
patent).
353· Robert P. Merges, Software and Patent Scope: A Report from the Middle Innings, 85 TEx. L.
REv. 1627, 16'72 (2007) ("Patents are surely playing a role in the age-old battle over 'shelf space' in this
competitive industry.").
354· See Christopher A. Cotropia, "After-Arising" Technologies and Tailoring Patent Scope, 61
N.Y.U. ANN. SURv. AM. L. 151, 171-73 (2005) ("[T]he broader the patent scope. the more protection
the patent holder receives and the more competing products she can exclude.").
355· See Gerard N. Magliocca, Blackberries and Barnyards: Patent Trolls and the Perils of
Innovation, 82 NoTRE DAME L. REv. 18<J9, 1829-30 (2007) ("As noted earlier, a vague patent makes it
harder for defendants to determine the scope of its protection and hence unwilling to take the risk of
going to trial.").
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encompass existing technologies relied on by companies with deep
pockets. "356
A vague and general patent specification and claim leads to unclear
patent boundaries. These are the two primary means of determining the
scope of exclusivity given by the patent. The claims are the primary tool
used to define exclusivity and the specification is meant to inform the
claims' meaning. 357 If both of these lack information about the invention
and are intentionally drafted in general and vague terms, the process of
defining the claims is difficult. 358 There is also uncertainty as to the
claims' ultimate, correct meaning, with poor inputs into the claim
interpretation process- vague and general claims and specificationresulting in erratic results. 359
Unclear boundaries create many of the problems of the patent
system. Jim Bessen and Michael Meurer point to unclear boundaries as
the root cause of the current patent crisis.300 Unclear boundaries increase
transaction costs surrounding patents-making licensing and settlement
more difficult. 361 Companies face more uncertainty as to which patents
block their innovations. 362 Patent holders have less understanding of who
they may assert their patents against and what shelf space a patent
provides. 363 Courts and the USPTO must expend more judicial resources
resolving the ambiguities created by unclear boundaries; and, in turn,
appeals and reversals are more prevalent. 364 Unclear boundaries also
facilitate patent trolls and the ability to hold up innovators by asserting
ambiguous patents. 365 Unclear boundaries therefore magnify some of the

356. See Brief of Amicus Curiae Yahoo! Inc., supra note 343, at 6.
357. Co tropia, supra note 346, at 79--82.
358. !d. at 9Q-9I.
359· /d.
360. BESSEN & MEURER, supra note 35, at 8-rr (concluding that the fuzzy and unpredictable
boundaries of patents prevent them from "work[ing] well as property").
361. Paul J. Heald, Optimal Remedies for Patent Infringement: A Transactional Model, 45 Hous. L.
REv. rr65, r I7D-7I (2oo8) ("The primary function of patent law is ill-served if the property right
embodied in the patent has poorly defined boundaries and therefore does a poor job of reducing
transaction costs.").
362. BESSEN & MEURER, supra note 35, at ro ("There is thus no reliable way of determining patent
boundaries short of litigation.").
363. /d. at 34-35 (noting how clearly-delineated property rights encourage investment into the
protected property).
364. See, e.g., Christian A. Chu, Empirical Analysis of the Federal Circuit's Claim Construction
Trends, r6 BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 1075, rogli--97 (2oor) (finding a growing trend of reversals of claim
interpretation holdings).
365. See David A. Fitzgerald II, Note, Saving Alternative Dispute Resolution in Patent Law:
Countering the Effects of the Patent Troll Revolution, 23 OHIO ST. J. ON DrsP. REsoL. 345, 36o n.76
("One of the ways patent trolls abuse the patent system is by filing continuing applications on their
vague patents in order to extend the patent term long enough to have a big corporation infringe the
patent.").

November 2009]

THE FOLLY OF EARLY FILING

II9

earlier articulated harms of the early-filing doctrine- underdevelopment
of early-filed patents and patent trolls. Essentially, ambiguous
boundaries strike at the heart of the efficient workings of the patent
system. 366
IV. A SoLUTION-OPTIMIZING FILING TIME BY REQUIRING AN AcTUAL
REDUCTION TO PRACTICE BEFORE ISSUANCE

The question is how to minimize the costs of the early filing system
while still maintaining some of its benefits. Recent proposals addressing
such problems as underdevelopment of patented inventions focus on the
end of the patent's life, not it's beginning. Abramowicz, for example,
proposes extending patent terms via auctions to minimize risk of
underdevelopment. 367 Those who do focus on the time of filing suggest an
even earlier filing date. Duffy recommends that patents be granted at a
very early stage of the development process.368 And when commentators
discuss moving patenting to a later point in the development process,
they dismiss it. Abramowicz mentions the "policy lever" of "requirin~
more achievement up front" to reduce the problems with early filing. 3
But he quickly rejects this solution as "crude."370 He argues that to
require more before filing "increases inefficient duplication" and
"exercises the policy lever at the beginning of the patent term when the
risk of underdevelopment is least clear." 371
This Article explores the road less traveled-a possible front-end
solution to the problems created by the early filing doctrine. 372 Filing

366. BESSEN & MEURER, supra note 35, at 8-13.
367. Abramowicz, supra note I4, at I ro6--IO.
368. Duffy, supra note I5, at 47I-72; see Abramowicz, supra note I4, at ro82 (noting that Duffy
considers moving filing later "but ends up offering the opposite recommendation: that patents should
be granted at a very early stage when they are mere patent prospects"). Duffy explains that filing is
moved earlier "based on the need to avoid duplication, not on a quixotic hope of limiting rivalry to
preserve rents." Duffy, supra note I5, at 498-99.
369. Abramowicz, supra note I4, at I 107.
370. /d.
37!. /d.
372. Ted Sichelman is a notable exception, recently proposing a two-tier patent system, with initial
patents and then a commercialization patent. See Ted Sichelman, Commercializing Patents, 62 STAN. L.
REv. (forthcoming 2010) (on file with the Hastings Law Journal). Sichelman's solution goes much
further than the one proposed here, creating a whole new patent right and various doctrinal changes to
handle this new right (as well as the rights granted under our current system. /d. In contrast, my
solution is much more targeted and, as will be explained, requires few changes to the current patent
system.
Another potential front-end solution is limiting continuation practice, as proposed in recent
rules from the USPTO. See Changes to Practice for Continued Examination Filings, Patent
Applications Containing Patentably Indistinct Claims, and Examination of Claims in Patent
Applications, 72 Fed. Reg. 46,7I6--843 (Aug. 2I, 2007) (to be codified at 37 C.F.R. pt. I). Notably,
these changes, if they ever go into effect, see Tafas v. Doll, 559 F.3d I345, I364-{i5 (Fed. Cir. 2009),
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early is what causes the problems articulated in Part III, so moving filing,
or at least examination, to a later time is the most direct response. The
question is how to change the timing without destroying the incentive to
invent and exacerbating the problems early filing is meant to solve.
There is also a need to change filing time in a meaningful, relevant waysomething more than a simple time delay or indiscriminate increase of
the filing fee. 373 Particularly, a change in the patent requirements is
needed that directly addresses the problems created by early filing.
Patent rules need to increase the amount of invention information and
certainty as to invention value available to an inventor prior to patenting.
Doing away with constructive reduction to practice and, in turn,
requiring all applicants to actually reduce their invention to practicethat is, actually implement the invention and observe that it works for its
intended purpose-before receiving a patent is the specific front-end
response explored below. While not a perfect solution, such a
requirement generates more technical information about the invention
prior to patent issuance, moves the inventor further down the
development path before examination, and gives the inventor a clearer
picture of the possible commercial value of the invention prior to
patenting. An actual reduction to practice requirement does not,
however, go too far because of the doctrine's flexibility, its tailoring to
the technology being invented, and the fact the doctrine stops well short
of requiring full commercialization.
A.

SPECIFICS OF THE SOLUTION: REQUIRING AN ACTUAL REDUCTION TO
PRACTICE

An actual reduction to practice occurs when the inventor builds the
product or performs the process for which she wishes to file an
application and then appreciates that the real-world implementation of
the invention achieves the intended results. 374 Currently an actual
reduction to practice is not required to "invent" under patent law. 375 A
constructive reduction to practice-the filing of a valid patent
application- acts as a substitute.376
The proposed solution to the costs of the early-filing doctrine is to
require an actual reduction to practice before the patent application is

only address the "file often" problem, not the "file early" problem.
373· These could be potential solutions, but their bluntness has the potential to do more damage
than good because they are not, as with an actual reduction to practice requirement, tuned to the
problems of early filing or to the actual invention at issue.
374· 3A DONALDS. CHISUM, CHISUM ON PATENTS§ IO.o6 (2005).
375· See supra Part I.A. I.
376. Frazer v. Schlegel, 498 F.3d 1283, 1288 (Fed. Cir. 2007) ("The filing of a patent application is a
constructive reduction to practice of the invention disclosed therein.").
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examined. Such a solution would work as follows: No longer would an
inventor be able to complete the process of invention by simply filing a
patent application. Instead, the invention would need to have actually
been reduced to practice to be examined by the USPTO. This means that
for an invention to be eligible for patentability, it would need to be
actually implemented.
While an inventor could initially file her application before actually
reducing to practice, she would need to implement her invention in the
real-world and make sure the invention produces the intended result
prior to being awarded a patent. After this occurred, she would append a
textual, and most likely graphical, description of this actual reduction to
practice to her patent application, proving to the USPTO that she has
met the requirement. There would be no need for the applicant to show
the examiner the invention in actual operation. Because of the
inequitable conduct requirement, the examiner could simply take the
applicant at her word that she actually performed the steps and observed
the results described in her patent application. 377 If the applicant is not
truthful in her recitation of the actual reduction to practice, the patent
would be rendered unenforceable by the inequitable conduct doctrine. 378
None of the other requirements for patentability would change. The
patentability requirements-such as the tests for novelty, the statutory
bar, and non-obviousness-would stay the same. The filing date would
still operate as the presumptive date of invention to the extent the
disclosed invention was reduced to practice. 379
The only difference would be the deferred examination by the
USPTO of a filed patent application.38o That is, an inventor would file for
a patent, but actual examination on that application would be deferred
until the inventor submitted her record of an actual reduction to practice.
This deferred examination process would mimic the intent-to-use (ITU)
application process in trademark law-where, when an applicant files an
ITU application for a trademark, she affirms that she intends to use the
mark in commerce within a defined period from the date of filing. 38 ' If

377· Inequitable conduct provides a self-verification mechanism for statements made to the
USPTO, allowing examiners to rely on the threat of patent unenforceability to ensure that statements,
such as the success of an actual reduction to practice, are true. See Christopher A. Cotropia,
Modernizing Patent Law's Inequitable Conduct Doctrine, 24 BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 723 (2009).
378. See Abbott Labs. v. Sandoz, Inc., 544 F.3d 1341, 1353 (Fed. Cir. 2008).
379· For example, if some of the claims were not reduced to practice, then those claims would not
be eligible for examination.
380. The concept of deferred examination is nothing new. See Changes to Practice for Petitions in
Patent Applications to Make Special and for Accelerated Examination, 71 FED. REG. 36,323, 36,323-24
(proposed June 26, 2oo6) (proposing a deferred examination system, although not keyed off an actual
reduction to practice requirement).
381. See 15 U.S.C. § 1051(b) (2006); Barry S. Wilson, Comment, Registration of Trademarks by the
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she fails to record actual use within this defined period, her ITU
application is considered to be abandoned. 382 A similar process would
work with the actual reduction to practice requirement, with an initial
filing prior to actual reduction operating like an ITU and the applicant
getting a defined period within which she needs to actually reduce to
practice or her patent application is abandoned. 383 An applicant can
essentially choose, during this deferral period, whether it is worth going
forward with development and reducing it to practice before patent
examination ever begins.
Accordingly, inventors would file as early as they do under the
current early-filing system. Once the inventor conceives of the invention
and can enable it in writing, they can file for a patent. However, the
USPTO would not immediately devote any resources to the pending
application. 384 Instead, the onus is on the applicant to continue with
development and, before the deferral period expires, actually reduce the
invention to practice in order to get the application examined and obtain
a patent. This solution does not change the date of filing, but it does
change the date of examination.
B.

BENEFITS TO AN ACTUAL REDUCTION TO PRACTICE REQUIREMENT

An Actual Reduction to Practice Requirement Would Generate
More Invention Information and Would Reduce Uncertainty
When Examination Begins
By requiring an actual reduction to practice before the grant of a
patent, patenting would still be early but not as early as under current
doctrine. The inventor would need to proceed further down the
technology development path prior to receiving patent protection. The
I.

Intent-to-Use Application, I2 J. CONTEMP. LEGAL ISSUES IIO, IIo-I5 (2001) (describing the ITU
process).
382. See IS U.S.C. § IOSI(d); Todd Jacobsen, Trademark Application Abandonment Under the
Lanham Act, I2 J. CONTEMP. LEGAL IssuEs 120, I2I n.7 (zooi) ("Failure of an ITU applicant to file a
timely statement of use also amounts to abandonment of the application.").
383. The defined period in which an initial application must be converted for examination by
actual reduction to practice can be changed depending on the invention's technological area. A good
starting period would be to use Japan's deferred examination period of three years-giving certainty
to those wondering if an initial application is going to be examined while providing time for inventors
to complete the reduction to practice process. See Japan Patent Office, Procedures for Obtaining a
Patent Right, http://www.jpo.go.jp/cgi/linke.cgi?url=/tetuzuki_e/t_gaiyo_e/pa_right.htm (last visited
Oct. 4, 2009).
384. Deferred examination has this benefit of not utilizing examination resources until
examination is elected. See Matthew L. Goldberg, The Viability of Stimulating Technology-Oriented
Entrepreneurial Activity in China, Taiwan, Japan, and South Korea: How Regulations and Culture
Encourage the Creation, Development, and Exploitation of Intellectual Property, I INT'L L. & MGMT.
REv. I, 2I (zoos) ("Japan has a deferred examination period for patents. Under this rule, a patent
application is examined only after a request for examination is filed.").
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actual reduction to practice requirement would force the inventor to
perform some successful prototyping and testing before examination
begins. 385
An actual reduction to practice requirement would generate more
technical information about the invention. The inventor would find out
how the invention operates under real-world conditions. 386 In addition,
the inventor would need to develop her invention to the point where
those skilled in the art would be sure that the invention works for its
intended purpose. 387 This pushes the invention closer to commercial
viability prior to the election of examination and the patent grant, in turn
providing more information about the invention's feasibility.
Additional technical information and definition reduce the
uncertainty surrounding the invention before examination begins. The
inventor gains a better handle on whether the invention provides the
wanted results. Furthermore, the additional time that passes while actual
reduction to practice is occurring produces more information of its own.
This all places the actual examination forward in time, giving the
inventor more certainty as to the invention's ultimate commercial
worth. 388
Admittedly, the actual reduction to practice requirement does not
guarantee the production of market information. The requirement is not
tied to commercial viability. 389 But, as mentioned earlier, it is unlikely
that an inventor would proceed further technically without gatheringeither intentionally or by happenstance-more market information
about the invention. 390 Technical feasibility also gives some sense of
market viability because an invention that does not produce the intended
result-an invention that would fail the actual reduction to practice
requirement-has little market worth. These types of inventions would

385. See, e.g., Slip Track Sys., Inc. v. Metal-Lite, Inc., 304 F.3d 1256, 1267 (Fed. Cir. 2002)
("Testing is required to demonstrate reduction to practice in some instances because without such
testing there cannot be sufficient certainty that the invention will work for its intended purpose.");
Scott v. Finney, 34 F.3d 1058, 1063 (Fed. Cir. 1994) (relying on a videotape of a prototype of the
invention in operation to establish actual reduction to practice).
386. See, e.g., Mahurkar v. C.R. Bard, Inc., 79 F.3d 1572, 1578-79 (Fed. Cir. 1996) (describing the
prototypes built by the inventor and the specific tests he performed to determine whether the invented
catheter would work well in humans).
387. See, e.g., Slip Track, 304 F.3d at 1265 (viewing the inventor's real-world tests of a prototype of
his invention to help walls withstand environmental forces through the eyes of a PHOSIT A).
388. See Abramowicz, supra note 14, at HY75-76 (noting that each additional year gives more
certainty as to the invention's worth).
389. See King Instrument Corp. v. Otari Corp., 767 F.2d 853, 861 (Fed. Cir. 1985) (noting that to be
an actual reduction to practice, the testing does not need to establish that the invention is in a
commercially-satisfactory stage of development).
390· See supra Part III.A.1-2.
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be eliminated prior to the election of examination because they would
not pass a mandatory actual reduction to practice requirement.
2.
An Actual Reduction to Practice Requirement Would Reduce the
Costs Associated with the Early-Filing Doctrine
There are many benefits of pushing the examination decision until
after actual reduction to practice. Initially, this allows the inventor to
make the first decision to commit USPTO resources to examination with
more information about the invention and, in turn, less uncertainty about
its value. She knows if the invention produces the intended result. She
can make a more informed call as to whether the invention is worth
patenting. In addition, to get to this stage of actual reduction to practice,
she needs to invest more of her own resources.
More invention information and greater resource investment prior
to examination reduces the number of conceived ideas that turn into
examined patent applications. Examination does not occur until later in
the development process-that is, further to the right of the development
process depicted in Figure 1 above. By pushing the beginning of
examination to this later stage, some ideas will simply not make it. Either
the lack of any value will become clear or the inventor will conclude that
the potential value of a conceived idea is not great enough to justify
engaging in the process of actually reducing to practice in the first place.
This lowers the number of patent applications to be examined,
minimizing one of the problems with the current early filing system.
There may also be fewer follow-up applications because
examination occurs later in time. What is currently a continuation
application would turn into an initial application where examination is
elected with an actual reduction to practice requirement. Reducing the
number of applications to be examined would also lower the number of
issued patents. Importantly, this reduction is not done arbitrarily, but is
the product of making the inventor go further down the development
path prior to examination.
Actually reducing to practice prior to patenting also increases the
chances of commercialization. It does this in two ways. First, examination
occurs later and under less uncertainty. The inventor, when electing
examination by actually reducing to practice, knows more about the
commercial value of the invention. 39 ' An invention is actually reduced to
practice when there are test results that "suffice to persuade practical
men to take the risk of commercializing the invention. "392 And the less
uncertainty when electing examination, the more likely the patent holder
will choose commercialization.
39 I. See supra Part II I.A. I -2.
392. Goodrich v. Harmsen, 442 F.2d 377,383 (C.C.P.A. 1971) (emphasis omitted).
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Second, the inventor has more invested in the invention when she
receives the patent. This means that full-blown commercialization is not
as comparatively costly as it is under the current system. Put another
way, while the price to acquire the option is higher, the exercise price is
lower, making it more likely that those patent options purchased will be
exercised- that is, commercialized.393 Referring to Figure 3 above, the
difference between the cost of the option and the cost of exercising is less
under the proposed solution.
By making commercialization more likely, an actual reduction to
practice requirement makes patent trolls less likely. The choice of
asserting the patent is not as cheap compared to commercialization as it
is under the current system. Since commercialization is less expensive,
given that patenting occurs closer to commercializing, asserting the
patent in litigation is not as inviting of an option. The difference in
exercise price between asserting the patent and commercializing the
underlying technology, shown in Figure 4 above, is less. The inventors
who obtain patents under the proposed solution are more invested in
bringing the invention to the market. This makes them less likely to turn
to patent-troll-like activities. And there are less unused patents-with
high commercialization costs-available to those wishing to engage in
patent-troll-like litigation. 394
The additional invention-specific information produced by an actual
reduction to practice also helps to better define the patent's scope of
exclusivity. Including a description of the actual reduction to practice in
the patent's specification provides more invention information to assist
in interpreting patent claims.395

c.

FLEXIBILITY OF THE REQUIREMENT HELPS PRESERVE EARLY FILING
BENEFITS

Requiring an actual reduction to practice to obtain patent
protection has potential negative effects. It delays the issuance of a
patent, which may undermine the prospect-oriented nature of the patent
system. Such a requirement increases the cost of patenting, forcing an
inventor to both expend resources and engage in uncertain research
393· See KELLEY, supra note 168, at 106-17 (explaining how building a prototype assists the
development process and providing examples from Amazon. com and Apple); THOMKE, supra note 168,
at so--51 (arguing that testing and experinientation is crucial to the successful development of new
technologies).
394· This situation-acquisition of uncommercialized patents by patent trolls-has occurred
before. "Since the dot-com collapse, bankruptcy auctions have been a fruitful source of electronics and
software patent rights" for patent trolls. J.P. Mello, Technology Licensing and Patent Trolls, 12 B.U. J.
Sci. & TEcH. L. 388, 392 (2oo6).
395· See Cotropia, supra note 347, at 83-87 (arguing that the use of invention-specific information
in the specification minimizes information costs, making determining claini-meaning more efficient).
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without the security of patent protection. There is also the potential for
small inventors to be priced out of the patent process-unable to reduce
to practice because of the lack of resources or expertise. 396 Even more
resource-rich inventors may be priced out if the invention's reduction
costs are abnormally high. The incentive to come up with the initial idea
may also be lost.
But all of these critiques fail to take into account the flexibility
inherent in the actual reduction to practice requirement. The
requirement does not always require extensive testing under actual
working conditions. 397 Testing needs to go only as far as necessary to
establish that the invention works as intended. If, in a given field,
computer simulation or laboratory tests satisfy such an inquiry, that is all
that is required by the actual reduction to practice requirement. 398 The
requirement tailors the level of development needed to what is required
in a given industry to establish feasibility. 399 And feasibility requirements
typically adjust with costs and implementation barriers associated with
the final, commercial embodiment. 400
The requirement also does not require proof of a perfected
invention. 401 The key is establishing that the invention works, not "how
well the [invention] works." 402 "[T]here is certainly no requirement that
an invention, when tested, be in a commercially satisfactory stage of
development in order to reduce the invention to practice. " 403
This flexibility in the requirement does a few of things. First, the
flexibility prevents the requirement from pricing small inventors with
fewer resources out of the patent system. An actual reduction to practice
is costly, but not as costly as it may seem at first blush. Second, it narrows
the gap between the patenting costs of inventions that are cheaper to
implement and those that are more expensive. Third, the requirement
does not push patenting too far down the development cycle. There is

396. The underlying assumption, that we need to provide patents for small inventors, is not a
given. See BESSEN & MEURER, supra note 35, at 173--83 (noting that it is unclear whether patents give
much value to small inventors).
397· CHISUM, supra note 374, § ro.o6(2)(a).
398. See King Instrument Corp. v. Otari Corp., 767 F.2d 853, 861 (Fed. Cir. 1985).
399· See Barmag Barmer Maschinenfabrik AG v. Murata Mach., Ltd., 731 F.2d 831,838 (Fed. Cir.
1984). "Some devices are so simple and their purpose and efficacy so obvious that their complete
construction is sufficient to demonstrate their workability." E. Rotorcraft Corp. v. United States, 384
F.2d 429, 431 (Ct. Cl. 1967).
400. See, e.g., Williams v. Adm'r of the Nat'! Aeronautics & Space Admin., 463 F.2d 1391, 13991400 (C.C.P.A. 1972) (finding a laboratory test of a component of a claimed spin-stabilized,
synchronous communications satellite sufficient to establish an actual reduction to practice).
401. See Coffee v. Guerrant, 3 App. D.C. 497, 499 (D.C. Cir. 1894) ("A perfect invention does not
necessarily mean a perfectly constructed machine .... ").
402. DSL Dynamic Scis. Ltd. v. Union Switch & Signal, Inc., 928 F.2d n22, 1126 (Fed. Cir. 1991).
403. /d.

November 2009]

THE FOLLY OF EARLY FILING

127

still significant space between the invention and complete
commercialization. Thus patents can still act as prospects, but they are
prospects that require a bit more front-end work to obtain than they do
under the current system. Fourth, the flexibility prevents an actual
reduction to practice requirement from forcing the inventor away from
the natural path of development in the relevant technological field. The
solution does not ask the inventor to do anything different than would be
done in the normal course of commercializing the invention-patenting
just occurs at a later stage.
Furthermore, technological areas that really benefit from the
prospect nature of patents are unaffected by an actual reduction to
practice requirement. Technological areas such as chemistry and biology,
which are typically championed as the areas that fully utilize the prospect
nature of patents,4" 4 are already under patentability requirements that de
facto force the inventor to actually reduce the invention to practice prior
to filing. 4" 5 For example, to meet the utility requirements set forth in In re
Fisher, the inventor had to find and prove an end use for the claimed
ESTs. 400 To do this, the inventor already has to actually reduce to
practice. This Article's proposed solution changes little in these
technological fields. 4"7
Placing the actual reduction to practice requirement within a
deferred examination scheme helps to further alleviate potential
problems with the proposal. There is still early filing shortly after
conception, meaning that the patent race is still stopped at the same time

404. Lemley. supra note 117, at 141 (noting that the prospect theory makes more sense "when
control over subsequent development is a necessary part of the incentive to produce the pioneering
invention in the first place, as is arguably true with pharmaceuticals").
405. Burk & Lemley, supra note 54, at 1678-80 ("[T]he inventor can have patent protection for
any given molecule only after a substantial investment has already been made in isolating and
characterizing the molecule.").
406. 421 F.3d 1365, 1369-73 (Fed. Cir. 2005).
407. There is still a concern that is worth noting. If a reduction to practice is a requirement, the
creation of improvements-inventions that build upon already-patented technology-may be tougher
to come by because actual infringement of the earlier patent would be mandated to meet the patent
requirements. 35 U.S.C. § 271(a) (2006) (indicating that "use" constitutes infringement); Christopher
A. Cotropia & Mark Lemley, Copying in Patent Law, 87 N.C. L. REv. 1421, 1432-33 (2009) (describing
the blocking patent situation arising from a patent on a base technology and the attempt to develop
and patent an improvement). I thank Clarisa Long for this insight.
This concern is likely minimal because an inventor can still file a patent application prior to
reduction to practice and then engage in the typical blocking patent bargaining. The single
use/infringement requirement to start examination is also so de minimis that the minimal remedies
available are unlikely to spur a lawsuit or deter most improvements. Finally, if this is a real problem,
then it is one that should already be plaguing those fields governed by the heighted utilty and
enablement requirements, where a de facto actual reduction to practice standard is being applied. See
supra notes 404-o6.
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as under the current system. 4o8 This captures the second benefit Kitch
articulated to early filing-ending wasteful patent races. 409
Allowing for an initial filing prior to an actual reduction to practice
could facilitate a market for reducing inventions to practice. 410 Even
inventors with little resources can shop their initial filing around to find
those willing to aid in reducing the invention to practice. Others may
monitor the initial filing to see what applications look promising or fit
within their company's technical direction and initiate talks with the
inventor to assist in reducing the invention to practice in exchange for an
interest in the resulting patent right. The creation of this market would
both help maintain the incentive for the creation of base ideas and give
small inventors a vehicle by which they could reduce to practice and
obtain patent protection. Building in a deferral period between initial
filing and the beginning of examination provides a nice transition
between the existing early filing system and the proposed solution.
Finally, the costs of an actual reduction to practice requirement
have to be weighed against the benefits. There is a zero sum here. While
alleviated partially by deferred examination, a shift away from the earlyfiling doctrine is still a shift away and some of the doctrine's benefits are
lost. But these negatives have an upside-they minimize the many costs
to early filing already articulated. And many of these costs, created by
the lack of invention information and uncertainty at the time of early
filing, directly frustrate many of the articulated benefits of early filing. 411
Thus, while an actual reduction to practice requirement may not allow
the patent system to fully enjoy the benefits of early filing, such a
requirement is unlikely to make the system any worse off with regards to
these benefits.
CONCLUSION

The basic goal of the patent system is the production of socially
beneficial technology. That is, technology that society can actually use.
The current early-filing doctrine clearly does not facilitate such
production. And given the focus of recent scholarship and pending firstto-file legislation, such a solution appears unlikely. While this Article
might not propose a perfect solution, the proposed modified actual

408. Filing ends the typical patent race. See Duffy, supra note 15, at 499-500.
409. Kitch, supra note 12, at 265-{;6.
410. Others have suggested a market for ideas, albeit before a patent application is filed. See Oren
Bar-Gill & Gideon Parchomovsky, A Markerplace for Ideas?, 84 TEx. L. REv. 395, 399-402, 421 (2005)
(arguing for an idea auction, where if the high bidder in the development stage fails "to produce a
patent or product within a given period, say two years" the idea is placed into the public domain).
411. See supra Part IIJ.C. (noting how early filing both hampers commercialization and increases
patent terms).
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reduction to practice requirement is a step in the right direction. Patent
reforms can be extremely effective if they are directed at the root of the
problems being considered. Here, the problem is the circumstances
surrounding the decision to patent. By making this a better-informed
decision, reforms can go a long way in mitigating many of the current
problems with the patent system.
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